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DRIVERLESS FINANCE
HILARY J. ALLEN*
While safety concerns are at the forefront of the debate about driverless
cars, such concerns seem to be less salient when it comes to the increasingly
sophisticated algorithms driving the financial system. This Article argues, however, that a precautionary approach to sophisticated financial algorithms is justified by the potential enormity of the social costs of financial collapse. Using
the algorithm-driven fintech business models of robo-investing, marketplace
lending, high frequency trading and token offerings as case studies, this Article
illustrates how increasingly sophisticated algorithms (particularly those capable
of machine learning) can exponentially exacerbate complexity, speed and correlation within the financial system, making the system more fragile. This Article
also explores how such algorithms may undermine some of the regulatory reforms that were implemented in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to make the
financial system more robust. Through its analysis, this Article demonstrates
that the algorithmic automation of finance (a phenomenon I refer to as “driverless finance”) deserves close attention from a financial stability perspective.
This Article argues that regulators should become involved with the processes
by which the relevant algorithms are created, and that such efforts should begin
immediately—while the technology is still in its infancy and remains somewhat
susceptible to regulatory influence.
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INTRODUCTION
Precautionary concerns are at the forefront of the debate about driverless cars: before autonomous vehicles driven by algorithms are marketed and
sold to the public, extensive testing is undertaken to ensure the safety of
passengers, other drivers, and bystanders.1 Safety concerns figure much less
prominently, however, in discussions about fintech and the increasing algorithmic automation of finance; this Article seeks to make these discussions more complete by considering how the increased prominence of
algorithms could undermine financial stability. Although risks of economic
failure may not be as viscerally salient as threats of injury by a rogue driverless car, prior financial crises have had devastating impacts on society—the
resulting increases in unemployment, poverty, and crime have indirectly impacted physical and mental health, and even led to premature deaths.2 This
Article therefore argues that a precautionary stance is also justified with regard to what I have termed “driverless finance”, and its potential impact on
us, the bystanders who will be harmed if a financial crisis damages the
broader economy.
“Financial stability” denotes a state of affairs where financial institutions and markets are functioning well and are robust to shocks, such that
they can continue to provide the capital intermediation, risk management
and payment services on which broader economic growth depends.3 Financial stability regulation is essentially a precautionary exercise, in the sense
that it errs on the side of avoiding the harm to the broader economy that can
be caused by institutional and market failure, even though such harms cannot be precisely predicted or quantified.4
Effective financial stability regulation requires a broadening of regulatory focus to encompass new innovations and business models as and when
they arise—including the latest generation of financial algorithms. While the
use of algorithms in finance is nothing new (an algorithm is ultimately just a
set of instructions executed by a computer),5 the ubiquity, sophistication and
1
For discussions about the regulation of driverless cars, see Jack Stilgoe, Machine learning, social learning and the governance of self-driving cars, 48 SOC. STUD. SCI. 25 (2018);
David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rule and Artificial Intelligence, 89
WASH. L. REV. 117 (2014); Michael Mattioli, Autonomy in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 24
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 227 (2018).
2
Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1087, 1095–7 (2015).
3
See Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in International Financial Regulation, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 929, 932 (2014).
4
See Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 173, 178 (2013).
5
See Andrew Tutt, An FDA For Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 92 (2017).
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autonomy of financial algorithms has increased significantly in recent years
due to advances in computing power and data usage techniques.6 High-frequency trading algorithms now execute their trades at speeds impervious to
human judgment and interference.7 In marketplace lending business models,
judgment calls about screening and rating potential borrowers have been almost entirely delegated to algorithms.8 Robo-investing business models similarly delegate the selection and ongoing assessment of investment
portfolios.9 Algorithms are also integral to tokens hosted on blockchain networks and sold in “initial coin offerings” (ICOs)—here, the very product
being offered to investors is a type of algorithm known as a smart contract,
and transactions are designed to be self-executing and insulated from human
intervention.10 This Article will explore the implications for financial stability of this unprecedented level of algorithmic autonomy in the financial system—autonomy that will only increase with technological advances in
machine learning.11
Of course, there are natural limitations on any contemporaneous assessment of the impact of increasingly automated algorithms on financial stability. Many of the fintech business models that rely heavily on algorithms
have not yet scaled up to a size where they are likely to have a significant
impact on the financial system as a whole, or the broader economy.12 Furthermore, none of these fintech business models have yet to be tested in a
crisis or a contracting economy, so we cannot learn from actual instances of
failure.13 That does not mean that this Article’s examination is too premature:
innovation can move from “‘too small to care’ to ‘too big to fail’ (systemically important) in very short periods of time,”14 especially when the relevant technologies are being adopted by established financial institutions that
are already “too big to fail.” While it may be tempting to defer considera6

See FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN FINANSERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 8 (2017),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011117.pdf [hereinafter, “FSB AI Report”] (discussing the technological developments that have facilitated the latest wave of financial
technology).
7
See Part II.C, infra.
8
See Part II.B, infra.
9
See Part II.A, infra.
10
See Part II.D, infra.
11
Machine learning will be discussed more fully in Part I, infra. Algorithms capable of
machine learning are programmed not to perform a particular task, but to draw lessons from a
data set about how to perform tasks in the future. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and
Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 88 (2014).
12
The FSB (an international group of regulators responsible for setting the international
agenda on financial stability issues) recently concluded that “there are currently no compelling
financial stability risks from emerging FinTech innovations.” FIN. STABILITY BD., FINANCIAL
STABILITY IMPLICATIONS FROM FINTECH: SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES THAT MERIT
AUTHORITIES’ ATTENTION 1 (2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf
[hereinafter, “FSB Fintech Report”].
13
See id.
14
Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 404 (2017).
CIAL
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tion of the systemic impact of automated financial decision-making until
after we have observed a failure of that technology, the costs of systemic
impact may be significant, and ex post measures tend to be limited in their
ability to contain the fall-out from crises.15 The potential for serious economic harm (and attendant social costs) necessitates creative thinking about
the risks that financial institutions and activities could create, along with
proposals for regulation to address those risks ex ante.16
It is therefore troubling that the Treasury Department’s recent report on
“Nonbank Financials, Fintech and Innovation” makes almost no mention of
the impact that machine learning, smart contracts, and other technological
innovations could have on financial stability.17 Machine learning and smart
contracts are currently in their infancy, but there will soon come an inflection point after which financial regulators will be circumscribed in their ability to influence the use of such technology in the financial markets.
Policymakers should therefore be thinking now about the potential impact of
driverless finance on financial stability and the broader economy. This Article seeks to kick-start this debate by exploring how financial stability may
be undermined by driverless finance’s increased speed and complexity. It
also explores how the propensity for increased delegation of decision-making to a few algorithms may lead to destabilizing correlation that undermines
financial stability (a phenomenon this article will refer to as “correlation by
algorithm”). It will also demonstrate that increased use of algorithms could
undercut existing financial stability regulation, including regulatory attempts
to instill a more stability-oriented financial culture in financial institutions.
Importantly, this Article is not intended to be an even-handed discussion of
the costs and benefits of driverless finance. The benefits of fintech innovation have already been much discussed (in the Treasury Department’s report
and elsewhere);18 this Article is intended to serve as a counterpoint to that
literature by highlighting threats to financial stability that have been neglected by others.
This Article will then consider possible precautionary responses to
these threats to financial stability. While regulators should not require conclusive proof of the safety of financial algorithms (something that is probably not feasible in any event), they should regulate the processes by which
sophisticated financial algorithms are developed. Correlation by algorithm,
for example, is likely to prove a challenging phenomenon to address, but
15

See Allen, supra note 2, at 1104.
The FSB has highlighted the need to think broadly about risks to financial stability
posed by the various fintech business models, individually and in concert. See FSB Fintech
Report, supra note 12, at 2–3.
17
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/
sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities—-Nonbank-Financi. . . .pdf [hereinafter, “Treasury Report”].
18
See id. See also Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of
Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 232 (2018).
16
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regulators could adopt principles-based regulation that requires that all financial algorithms at least contemplate the possibility of low-probability but
high-consequence events—the type of events that bring about financial crises. In order to slow down individual transactions and preserve flexibility in
a tightly coupled system, regulators could require that smart contracts embedded in financial assets include some form of circuit breaker, and be
hosted on a distributed ledger maintained by identifiable nodes with the
power to undo erroneous transactions. More generally, requiring preapproval
of financial algorithms before they can be utilized could at least slow the
financial system’s inexorable march towards mystifying complexity.19 There
is also a place for precaution in regulators’ ongoing supervision of firms,
ensuring that those firms have the necessary internal governance structures
to oversee their usage of automated algorithms and make changes and corrections when risks become apparent.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. First, Part I will
make the normative argument for why a precautionary, financial stabilityoriented approach to regulating driverless finance should be embraced,
drawing analogies from the literature on autonomous vehicles. Part II will
then introduce some of the most algorithm-dependent fintech business models, which will be used as examples in Part III. Part III illustrates how increasingly sophisticated algorithms can exponentially exacerbate
complexity, speed and correlation within the financial system, rendering the
system more fragile. Part III also considers how the latest algorithms may
undermine the regulatory reforms that were implemented in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis in order to make the financial system more robust. Part
IV offers some preliminary recommendations for how regulators should implement a precautionary approach to driverless finance, focusing on the process by which algorithms are created. The Article concludes on a note of
optimism, briefly hypothesizing a best-case scenario in which a precautionary approach results in algorithms that enhance financial stability.
I. A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH

TO

SOPHISTICATED ALGORITHMS

Laws designed to address a world of primarily human actors are being
strained by twenty-first century technological innovations that subvert this
paradigm.20 Decision-making is increasingly being delegated to algorithms,
and the algorithms themselves are becoming increasingly sophisticated in
their decision-making. While previous generations of algorithms could only
act in ways dictated by their programmers,21 algorithms are now being
programmed to draw their own decision-making rules from exposure to vo19
Such approval would not require conclusive proof of a financial product’s safety. See
Allen, supra note 4, at 195–96 and accompanying text.
20
See Stilgoe, supra note 1.
21
See Vladeck, supra note 1, at 120.
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luminous data sets22—a phenomenon known as machine learning.23 Driverless cars, for example, will be guided by machine learning algorithms that
have been trained using vast proprietary data sets captured by driving around
highways and cities (a phenomenon referred to as “fleet learning”).24 Fleet
learning involves algorithms drawing patterns from observed data to allow
them to make sense of the world outside of the vehicle and to make decisions about how to react to observed stimuli when driving.25 While many
financial firms currently use much simpler, more predictive algorithms in
their businesses, one can reasonably expect that as time goes on, financial
business models will also become increasingly reliant on machine learning
algorithms that draw patterns from selected data sets.26 Financial regulators
face significant challenges engaging even with predictive algorithms,27 and
machine learning algorithms will pose even greater challenges for regulators
trying to maintain the safety of the financial system.
Discussing regulatory challenges associated with machine learning generally, Andrew Tutt has identified two broad categories of difficulty: difficulty predicting algorithmic output (in other words, how the algorithms will
react in a given set of circumstances), and difficulty explaining why an algorithm acted in a particular way after the fact.28 To illustrate in the context
of driverless cars, the most obvious differences between human and algorithmic decision-making manifest in what are known as “edge cases”—
“scenarios that cars seldom encounter, and might be unable to handle without specific training.”29 Here, it is quite possible that the algorithm will
make sense of the world and react in a very different way than a human
would. It is very hard to predict how the algorithm will direct the vehicle to
react in these edge cases, and if something does go wrong, it can be very
difficult after the fact to unearth why the algorithm made the decision it
did.30 In finance, decision-making by machine learning algorithms has the
potential to be similarly fraught. Such algorithms do not understand financial
markets in the same way that humans do: humans tend to rely on narratives
to make sense of the world, whereas algorithms tend to focus on statistical

22

See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 29.
See Surden, supra note 11, at 88.
24
See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 35.
25
See Tutt, supra note 5, at 85–86.
26
See FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 33 (“Most market participants expect that AI and
machine learning will be adopted further.”).
27
See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a
Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing the difficulties that regulators face in
engaging with computer risk models); Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715 (2018) (discussing the difficulties that regulators face in engaging with
high-frequency trading algorithms).
28
See Tutt, supra note 5, at 101.
29
Mattioli, supra note 1, at 295.
30
See Tutt, supra note 5, at 102.
23
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data points.31 It is true that advances in semantic research may make algorithms more adept at mirroring human understanding at some point,32 but for
the foreseeable future, algorithms are likely to be hampered in their ability to
see the big picture in the way that humans do.33 The unpredictability of algorithmic decision-making in unusual circumstances should set off alarm
bells for regulators charged with promoting the safety and stability of the
financial system.
Concerns about safety are certainly at the forefront of debates about the
algorithms driving autonomous vehicles.34 Although policymakers continue
to grapple with the question of “How safe is safe enough”? when it comes
to autonomous vehicles,35 the general societal consensus seems to be that
some degree of precaution with respect to driverless cars is appropriate. By
precaution, I mean that policies should err on the side of avoiding significant
harm, notwithstanding uncertainty about the nature of such harm and the
probability of it occurring.36 The form of precaution that I advocate for does
not require that an activity be proven riskless before it can proceed —it
does, however, create a presumption that the benefits of precautionary regulation outweigh the associated costs, notwithstanding that the benefits may
be difficult (if not impossible) to quantify.37
Ultimately, decisions about the degree of precaution to be utilized are
value-laden and reflect cultural attitudes towards risks and the costs of protecting against them. The United States is often characterized as being particularly skeptical of precautionary regulatory regimes, choosing to privilege
the promotion of innovation over protection from the risks that such innovation may create.38 Attempts to pioneer a precautionary regulatory approach
to driverless finance in the United States may face significant political challenges as a result. While the United States does not always reject precautionary policies (the precautionary anti-terrorist measures taken by the United

31
See Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England, Speech at Data Analytics
for Finance and Macro Research Centre, King’s Business School: Will Big Data Keep Its
Promise? 12 (Apr. 19, 2018).
32
See id.
33
See Mattioli, supra note 1, at 285.
34
See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 46. Algorithms controlling the availability of electricity,
and the provision of medical care, have similarly been identified as capable of “inflicting
unusually grave harm,” and thus the debate about them revolves around safety concerns. See
Tutt, supra note 5, at 117.
35
See Mattioli, supra note 1, at 296.
36
See Allen, supra note 4, at 191.
37
See id. at 197–98.
38
“According to prevalent stereotypes today, Americans are said to be individualistic,
technologically optimistic, forward-looking, risk-taking, and antiregulatory, confident that new
technology and the power of markets will solve every problem and that precaution is a waste
of time and a hindrance to progress.” Jonathan B. Wiener, The Rhetoric of Precaution, in THE
REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
7 (Jonathan B. Wiener ed., 2011). Even in the context of driverless cars, Stilgoe argues that
regulation may ultimately be less precautionary than desirable because “concerns about liberty
are relatively elevated over public safety” in the United States. Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 46–47.
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States since September 11 are evidence of this),39 antipathy for precautionary
regulation is likely to manifest itself in the context of financial stability regulation, where harms resulting from economic failure tend to be less salient
than harms to life and limb.40 Perhaps for similar reasons, regulatory approaches to disembodied software have also tended to be relatively technical
and unconcerned with value judgments about risks.41
There is almost no discussion of financial stability in the latest Treasury
Report on fintech innovation, which instead enthusiastically embraces technological developments and market solutions.42 As I have argued previously,
however, a precautionary approach to financial stability regulation should be
pressed despite the political challenges.43 The fallout from financial crises
may sometimes seem abstract, but it can include very real deteriorations in
mental and physical health, as well as economic problems like significant
reductions in personal wealth and unemployment.44 Purely ex post regulatory
measures are limited in their ability to contain the fall-out from systemic
failures,45 and such measures may also have significant unforeseen economic
consequences (for example, the extended period of low interest rates that
followed the 2008 financial crisis incentivized investment in riskier assets in
a search for yield, potentially sowing the seeds of future financial instability).46 Financial system failure may also have undesirable political consequences: a decade after the 2008 financial crisis, Jeffrey Gordon remarked
that “[t]he actions that were necessary to save the financial system from
collapse (and to avoid an even worse economic and human outcome) produced a pattern of winners and losers that could not be defended on any
principle of desert,” setting the stage for the current rise of populism around
the world.47
Where financial innovation has the potential to generate catastrophic
externalities for society at large, taking a “wait-and-see” approach to regulation is inadequate. It is foolhardy to wait to see the systemic damage that
increasingly autonomous financial algorithms might inflict before starting to
consider their potential impact, even if it is hard to predict precisely what
39
See Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE, 286 (Jonathan B. Wiener ed., 2011).
40
See Allen, supra note 4, at 194; see also SINGAPORE’S PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
COMMISSION, A PROPOSED MODEL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 2
(2019) (“The impact on an individual of an autonomous decision in, for example, medical
diagnosis will be greater than in processing a bank loan.”).
41
See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 35.
42
See Treasury Report, supra note 17.
43
See Allen, supra note 4. In a recent book chapter, Gordon has also made the case for a
precautionary approach to financial stability regulation. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Dynamic Precaution’ in Maintaining Financial Stability: The Importance of FSOC, in TEN YEARS AFTER
THE CRASH (Sharyn O’Halloran & Thomas Groll eds., 2018).
44
See Allen, supra note 2, at 1095–97.
45
See id. at 1104.
46
See id. at 1104–05.
47
See Gordon, supra note 43, at 3.
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that impact will be. Business models like marketplace lending and roboinvesting aim to serve important niches of the economy that are underserved
by the traditional financial system. If such business models fail after gaining
significant market share, there may not be any substitutes for their services
and the real economy may suffer. In addition, larger established financial
institutions that are integral to the proper functioning of the broader economy are increasingly adopting algorithmic approaches to their core businesses in an attempt to remain competitive.48 These institutions may also
decide to invest in ICOs and other offerings of fintech firms, providing yet
another conduit for issues with algorithmic finance to impact the more established financial system and the economy at large. This Article therefore argues that regulators should engage in early-stage dialogue with the creators
of these new technologies—a precautionary approach to reviewing a technology considers the process by which it is created, instead of restricting
regulatory oversight to the finished product.49
In this venture, time is of the essence. Although there are many who
take the view that regulators should defer regulating fintech until after a
market failure has occurred so that the pitfalls of a fintech business model
can be laid bare by experience,50 once the market for a particular financial
product or service becomes well-established, opportunity for regulatory intervention becomes limited.51 This narrowing of opportunity is partly a result
of political economy: an established industry will have more clout to resist
regulation, and regulators are often loath to upset market expectations about
the regulatory treatment of an established product or service.52 It is also an
issue of technology, though—it is far more difficult to alter the workings of
a technology once it is operational than it is to help shape it during development.53 Machine learning and smart contracts, as applied to finance, are in
their infancy. If regulators miss this window of opportunity, the technology
of driverless finance may become inscrutable and largely unregulatable—
but any problems that the technology creates for financial stability and the
broader economy will still be borne by society as a whole.54
48
See FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 9, 30. The Treasury Department reports that
“[f]irms expect that the effective use of AI, machine learning and big data analysis will be a
key source of competitive advantage, which is spurring investment and competition.” Treasury
Report, supra note 17, at 56. Established institutions might also use the existence of fintech
competitors as justification for lobbying for lighter touch regulation. See Gordon, supra note
43.
49
See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 30.
50
See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of
FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1308–09 (2016).
51
See Allen, supra note 4, at 223.
52
See Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1850 (2011); Kenneth C. Kettering,
Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1651 (2008).
53
See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 29–30.
54
As Omarova has argued, “[u]nless the public side proactively counters new technologies’ potentially destabilizing systemic effects, it may soon find itself in an impossible position
of having to back up an uncontrollable and unsustainably self-referential financial system.”
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II. CASE STUDIES: ALGORITHM-DRIVEN FINTECH BUSINESS MODELS
Increased use of algorithms is permeating all aspects of finance,55 but
nowhere is this trend more apparent than in several new fintech business
models. By way of background, “fintech” is an umbrella term that is generally understood to encompass mobile payment services, robo-investing, marketplace lending (otherwise known as “P2P lending”), crowdfunding,
virtual currencies, and tokens sold in ICOs.56 Some scholars also include
high-frequency trading in their discussions of fintech products and services.57 Even though they are often grouped together, these business models
are very diverse. Importantly for this Article, some are much more reliant on
algorithms than others. Because sophisticated algorithms are integral to the
robo-investing, marketplace lending, high-frequency trading, and token business models, this Article will use them as examples as it considers the financial stability implications of increased reliance on sophisticated algorithms.
Part II will therefore provide a brief introduction to these business models.
Importantly, though, this Part should not be viewed as an exhaustive list of
the business models that rely heavily on algorithms; even more traditional
financial business models are relying increasingly on driverless finance, and
thus this Article’s concerns have much wider application than the fintech
business models profiled in this Part.
A. Robo-Investing
The term “robo-advisor” is popularly used to describe “an automated
investment service . . . which competes with financial advisors by claiming
to offer equally good (if not better) advice and service at a lower price.”58
While robo-advisory services are being developed for banking and insurance
products as well as for securities,59 this Article will focus on the more developed sector of “robo-investing” in securities. Broadly speaking, this industry uses algorithms to provide automated “customer profiling, asset
allocation, portfolio selection, trade execution, portfolio rebalancing, taxloss harvesting and portfolio analysis.”60 Different firms provide robo-inSaule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J.
REG. 735, 793 (2019).
55
For a survey of many of the existing applications of machine learning in finance, see
FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 1.
56
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-364, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION ON SUBSECTORS AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 1 (2017).
57
See, e.g., Arner et al., supra note 50, at 1291–92; Thomas Philippon, The Fintech Opportunity 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22476, Aug. 2016), https://
www.nber.org/papers/w22476.pdf.
58
Tom Baker & Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 719-20 (2018).
59
See id. at 720–21.
60
FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2 (Mar. 2016), https://www.finra
.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf.
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vesting services in different ways, but most robo-investing models tout their
potential to democratize investing by providing low-cost financial advice to
customers who may only have small amounts of capital.61 Robo-investing
algorithms may also be more competent than human financial advisers62 and
may avoid the conflicts of interests that plague human advisers (depending
on how the selection algorithm is designed).63 While many robo-investing
platforms currently use predictive algorithms, there is enormous interest in
applying machine learning techniques to collect information about clients’
financial circumstances and improve portfolio selection.64
The SEC has noted that most robo-investing services start their relationship with the investor by utilizing an online questionnaire to assess an investor’s financial situation and risk tolerance.65 The subsequent relationship
between the robo-investing firm and the investor then varies by business
model. Some robo-investing firms “are essentially automated interfaces that
offer investment advice and discretionary investment management services
without the intervention of a human adviser, using algorithms and asset allocation models that are advertised as being tailored to each individual’s investment needs.”66 Other robo-investing services may be designed to
provide information to a human intermediary who will ultimately interface
with the customer and provide a more comprehensive set of financial planning services.67 Others, like Betterment,68 strike a middle ground by offering
an automated interface with the option of receiving additional advice from
financial professionals.69 All of these types of businesses are likely to be
subject to the same investor protection regulations that non-automated financial advisors face.70 In the United States, this means that robo-investing

61

See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 58, at 714.
“[A] large body of research in diverse fields demonstrates that even simple algorithms
regularly outperform humans in the kinds of tasks that robo advisors perform.” Id. at 716.
63
See id. at 732.
64
See, e.g., DELOITTE, THE NEXT FRONTIER: THE FUTURE OF AUTOMATED FINANCIAL ADVICE IN THE UK 22 (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-nl-fsi-the-future-of-automated-financial-advice-in-the-uk.pdf.
65
See Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisors, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www
.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-robo-advisers.
66
Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Intermediation and Markets: Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. POL’Y 55, 88
2016.
67
See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 58, at 739. FINRA uses slightly different terminology,
excluding “financial professional-facing tools” from its definition of “robos.” FINRA, supra
note 60, at 2.
68
See BETTERMENT.COM, https://www.betterment.com/financial-experts/ (last visited July
16, 2019).
69
FINRA, supra note 60, at 3.
70
Such regulation is likely to take the form of “licensing and education requirements
designed to ensure that an intermediary has at least a minimum level of competence regarding
the products that the intermediary is licensed to sell; disclosure requirements and antifraud
rules that require intermediaries to be honest with their customers; and standards of conduct,
such as the fiduciary standard, designed to encourage intermediaries to match their customers
with suitable financial services.” Baker & Dellaert, supra note 58, at 724.
62
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firms are likely to be required to register as either investment advisers or
broker/dealers. For example, Betterment has registered with the SEC as an
investment adviser and also has a subsidiary broker-dealer registered with
FINRA.71
B. Marketplace Lending
When fintech lending models first rose to prominence in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis, they promoted the “peer-to-peer” aspect of their
process: the model sought to arrange funding for non-traditional borrowers
from non-traditional lenders by capitalizing on users’ sense of online community.72 In recent years, however, there has ceased to be much real sense of
community or personal connection between borrower and lender. Now, a
prospective borrower requests a loan using a secure online platform (provided by a firm like Prosper or LendingClub), and then that platform utilizes
a proprietary algorithm to make an initial approval decision based on information gathered from the prospective borrower and other sources.73 If the
prospective borrower meets the necessary criteria, then the lender platform
will depersonalize the information it has about the prospective borrower and
send the information (including an interest rate for the customer) out to prospective investors.74 If sufficient investors are interested in funding the loan,
the loan will be made, and the lender platform will process repayments and
provide administrative services in connection with the loan.75 These loans

71
Athwal Nav Athwal, Fintech Startups Navigate Legal Gray Areas To Build BillionDollar Companies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/19/fintechstartups-navigate-legal-gray-areas-to-build-billion-dollar-companies/.
72
See Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer
Lending and Kickstarter, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 604 (2015).
73
See John L. Douglas, New Wine Into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory
World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 27 (2016). It is possible that such data may be gleaned from
non-traditional sources like “social media, public records (property transactions, births, deaths,
marriage, divorce, criminal and civil legal matters, and the like), GPS and satellite tracking,
and cameras.” Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting FinTech Law, 18 FINTECH LAW REP. 1, 5
(2015).
74
See Douglas, supra note 73, at 27.
75
See id. The legal structure underlying the business models of the Prosper and LendingClub platforms is somewhat complicated. The loan is not actually made by the platform, but by
an established financial institution with which the platform has a relationship. The platform
then purchases the loan from the financial institution, using funds provided by the investors.
While an investor’s right to repayment is tied to the receipt of repayments from the ultimate
borrowers, it takes the legal form of an unsecured note issued by the lending platform. See
Judge, supra note 72, at 619; see also Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online
Peer-to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory
Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 493 (2012). This structure
implicates the securities laws, requiring lending platforms to register the issuance of the notes
and make attendant disclosures in an attempt to protect investors—indeed, LendingClub had to
suspend business in 2008 in order to bring itself into compliance with these laws. See Douglas,
supra note 73, at 38; Athwal, supra note 71.
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are often unsecured76 and are typically for amounts under $50,000 for small
businesses and around $10,000 for individual consumers.77 As such lending
has become increasingly popular, the vast majority of the funds loaned has
come from large institutional investors, resulting in a shift in terminology
from “P2P lending” to “marketplace lending.”78
Algorithms are central to the business case for marketplace lending:
they enable platforms to screen and rate would-be borrowers in a way that is
quicker and less resource-intensive than a traditional bank credit assessment.79 Increasingly, machine learning algorithms are also enabling marketplace lending platforms to expand the pool of borrowers they deem
creditworthy.80 Using such algorithms, platforms can quickly collate and
synthesize voluminous amounts of data about the applicant from non-traditional sources (including social media), allowing for a more complete portrait of the credit applicant.81 The time it would take a human to perform a
similar check of such resources would likely be prohibitive. Frank Pasquale
and others have raised important concerns about such machine learning algorithms violating privacy and exacerbating discrimination in the provision
of credit, but those concerns are beyond the scope of this Article.82 Instead,
our focus is on financial stability concerns; the ability of machine learning
algorithms to accurately predict creditworthiness—and accurately reflect
creditworthiness in the interest rate to be charged—is therefore more
relevant.

76
See Eleanor Kirby & Shane Worner, Crowd-funding: An Infant Industry Growing Fast
37 (Int’l Org. Sec. Comm’ns, Working Paper No. 3, 2014).
77
See Stephen Fromhart, Marketplace lending 2.0: Bringing on the next stage in lending 7
(2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/usfsi-markeplace-lending2.pdf.
78
See Lalita Clozel, Could Online Lending Become the Next Systemic Risk, AM. BANKER
(Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/could-online-lending-become-thenext-systemic-risk; Judge, supra note 72, at 613.
79
“These lending platforms allow borrowers to have their loans approved faster and funds
dispersed quicker than if the borrower sought a loan from a traditional bank.” Douglas, supra
note 73, at 27.
80
See FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 12.
81
“While it is not known exactly what specific set of alternative data are used by each of
the specific fintech lenders, some have mentioned information drawn from bank account transactions such as utility or rent payments, other recurring transactions, and electronic records of
deposit and withdrawal transaction. Other items mentioned include insurance claims, credit
card transactions, consumer’s occupation or details about their education, their use of mobile
phones and related activities, Internet footprints, online shopping habit, investment choice, and
so on.” Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemiux, The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine
Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the LendingClub Consumer Platform 2–3 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 18-15, 2018), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/
media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2018/wp18-15r.pdf.
82
See generally, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). See also Rory Van Loo, The Corporation
as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 579–80 (2016).
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C. High-Frequency Trading
High-frequency trading is sometimes treated as separate from other
fintech business models because it is not a consumer-facing product or service. Nevertheless, it is a relatively new financial phenomenon that is highly
dependent on algorithms and thus is an appropriate focus of any discussion
of driverless finance. High-frequency trading of financial assets is accomplished by algorithms deploying “fully automated trading strategies with
very high trading volume and extremely short holding periods ranging from
milliseconds to minutes.”83 There are a multiplicity of different high frequency trading strategies, but one widely-shared characteristic is “[t]he
strong focus on speed of execution and portfolio turnover;” humans cannot
trade quickly enough to profit from this type of strategy, so trading decisions
must be delegated to algorithms.84 Many high-frequency trading firms also
use algorithms to help identify and evaluate trading opportunities.85 When
markets are functioning normally, increased high-frequency trading correlates with lowered costs, greater speed, improved market efficiency and increased liquidity for other traders in the markets.86 However, these benefits
(particularly the increased liquidity) tend to disappear when markets go haywire.87 High-frequency trading has been implicated in many of the last decade’s market glitches88: the 2010 Flash Crash remains the most significant of
these, but there was also a treasury flash crash in October 2014,89 and a
number of so-called “mini flash crashes,” in which “[i]ndividual stocks
[including Walmart and Google] at times gyrate[d] wildly within fractions
of a second, only to reset moments later.”90
To a large extent, the high-frequency trading algorithms currently being
used are predictive, programmed by the so-called “quants.” While there are
efforts afoot to use more sophisticated machine learning algorithms to make
trading decisions, such efforts face major challenges. Significant (human)
manpower needs to be continually deployed in defining the borders and
granularity of the trading data set for the algorithms to learn from, and
83
X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility and Price Discovery 1 (Dec.
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691679.
84
TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY
THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 23 (2011).
85
See id. at 22–23.
86
See ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY IN
CAPITAL MARKETS 16 (2015); TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note
84, at 10.
87
See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten and Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock
Market: Sense and Nonsense 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 248 (2015).
88
See Allen, supra note 27, at 738.
89
See Matt Levine, Algorithms Had Themselves a Treasury Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG
(Jul. 13, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-07-13/algorithms-hadthemselves-a-treasury-flash-crash.
90
Kara M. Stein, Remarks before Trader Forum 2014 Equity Trading Summit (Feb. 6,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540761194.
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human judgment must be exercised as to which “noise” signals to eliminate
from the data set.91 If the algorithm is restricted to a historical data set, then
that may not be predictive of the future. On the other hand, if the algorithm
is constantly learning from market movements in real time, then that may
slow down the algorithm to the point that it is unable to complete with
leaner, faster predictive high-frequency trading algorithms.92 Notwithstanding these present difficulties, however, future technological advances may
render high-frequency trading by machine learning algorithms more feasible,
and it is impossible to predict how such algorithms would behave in the
event of future market glitches.
D. Tokens and Other “Smart Assets”
This section will conclude Part II with a discussion of token-related
business models. When tokens are sold, in many respects, the algorithm is
the asset: a token is “nothing more than an entry in a ledger that specifies
that a particular user . . . is the sole party able to exercise a discrete set of
powers associated with the ledger entry.”93 Those powers are established by
“smart contracts,” algorithms of varying degrees of sophistication that govern the functionality of the asset sold and that are intended to be self-executing and self-enforcing94—in other words, the contract is not supposed to be
“subject to interpretation by outside entities or jurisdictions.”95 At present,
tokens are being sold in ICOs in exchange for virtual currency.96 Some ICOs
feature utility tokens which “grant holders the right to access (or a license to
use) a given technology or participate in an online organization. They tend to
provide holders with governance rights, such as the right to vote on how the

91
See Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market Microstructure and High Frequency Trading, in HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 1 (2013), https://www
.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/papers/KearnsNevmyvakaHFTRiskBooks.pdf.
92
See Paul Golden, FX: Machine Learning Use Grows, But Lags in HFT , EUROMONEY
(Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b19b36yppj92q5/fx-machine-learninguse-grows-but-lags-in-hft.
93
Shaanan Cohney et. al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 602
(2018).
94
See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 333
(2017). “The term ‘smart contract’ refers to decentralized computer code that runs on a DLT
protocol and manifests some combination of the following characteristics: exerts some control
over assets digitally recorded on a DLT protocol, takes some action upon receipt of specified
data, [may be part of a DLT-based application], guarantees execution, and writes the resulting
state change from the operation of the smart contract into the DLT’s ledger.” Carla L. Reyes, If
Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 383–84 (2018).
95
David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK (Jun. 27, 2016), https://www
.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/. “The utopian ideal is a “grand merger of
law and computer security” which might render the protection offered by [traditional institutions] to be at best superfluous.” Cohney et al., supra note 93, at 20.
96
Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of
Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 922 (2018).
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online service should be updated or evolve.”97 Other ICOs offer investment
tokens, which are “not only functional in nature but provide holders with
economic rights, such as a share of profits generated by a project or
organization.”98
Tokens rely on “distributed ledger” technology for the processing of
transactions.99 I have described this technology as “a large, decentralized
database that is maintained on a network of computers rather than a single
server, and that is updated in real-time,”100 but there are a number of different variants of the technology. Distributed ledgers may or may not be controlled by a central authority (if not, they are described as “decentralized”),
and they may also be “permissioned” or “permissionless” (with permissioned ledgers requiring some form of permission to join the network of
computers that maintain the ledger, and permissionless ledgers allowing anyone to join).101 A related concept is the one of “trustlessness”: distributed
ledgers may or may not be trustless, in the sense that they do not require
third-party verification.102 Perhaps the most prominent example of a permissionless, trustless, decentralized ledger is the blockchain used to facilitate
Bitcoin transactions. However, the Ethereum ledger, rather than the Bitcoin
one, is typically used to host tokens and facilitate ICOs (at least for now).103
ICOs have been described as the wild west of finance,104 and the SEC
has made clear its concerns about ICOs being used to circumvent investor
protection regulations.105 However, many assets that were once viewed as
overly speculative and ripe for fraud have now matured into integral parts of
97
Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 475 (2019).
98
Id. at 476.
99
Distributed ledger technology can also be used to process transactions involving assets
other than digital money – including securities and real property. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield,
Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL L. REV. 805, 808–09 (2015). However, an exploration of this application of distributed ledger technology is beyond the scope of this Article.
100
Hilary J. Allen, $ = =
C = Bitcoin?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 886 (2017). “[E]ach party
with the software can access the full ledger, its history, and can send information directly to
other nodes, without going through an intermediary.” Reyes, supra note 94, at 380.
101
See Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 NYU J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 844 (2015).
102
See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.713, 722 (2017).
103
Robinson, supra note 96, at 21–22.
104
See, e.g., id.
105
“Those who offer and sell securities in the United States must comply with the federal
securities laws, including the requirement to register with the Commission or to qualify for an
exemption from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws. The registration
requirements are designed to provide investors with procedural protections and material information necessary to make informed investment decisions. These requirements apply to those
who offer and sell securities in the United States, regardless whether the issuing entity is a
traditional company or a decentralized autonomous organization, regardless whether those securities are purchased using U.S. dollars or virtual currencies, and regardless whether they are
distributed in certificated form or through distributed ledger technology.” SEC, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE
DAO 18 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
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standard asset portfolios.106 It is not difficult to conceive of ICOs as harbingers of an increasingly algorithmic world of finance where smart contracts
represent other bundles of rights and obligations that can be bought and sold
for sovereign as well as virtual currency. All financial assets are legally constructed;107 in the future, the legal contracts that comprise financial assets
may take the form of self-executing algorithms, rather than being evidenced
by the paper contracts that currently set out the rights and obligations of
asset holders and issuers. In this Article, I shall refer to financial assets that
consist of a self-executing, self-enforcing algorithm as “smart assets” (this
choice of name is derived from the term “smart contracts”—it is not intended to convey any judgment about whether such assets are in fact a good
idea).
Imagine, for example, a contingent convertible bond. I have previously
described such a bond (or “coco”, as it is colloquially known) as “a hybrid
debt-equity instrument that starts its life as a debt instrument (like a bond)
but will convert to common shares upon the occurrence of a ‘trigger event,’
thus providing the issuing bank with a fresh infusion of common shares.”108
Typical convertible bonds convert to equity at the election of the bondholder;
contingent convertible bonds instead convert upon the occurrence of prespecified trigger events relating to accounting or market metrics, or to decisions by regulatory supervisors.109 Theoretically, the terms of a coco could
be translated into computer code as a smart contract (a “smart coco,” if you
will). The smart contract would be recorded on some type of distributed
ledger, and the contract’s code would work to automatically make interest
payments from the issuer to the holder (the payments would be made in
some form of virtual currency—in the future, there may be virtual versions
of sovereign currencies like the U.S. dollar). If the holder wished to trade the
smart coco, the distributed ledger would be updated to reflect the new holder
of the smart coco, and the code would automatically order that interest payments be made to the new holder. Meanwhile, the smart contract would
check the information sources specified in its code at the times specified in
its code to determine whether a trigger event has occurred. Upon receiving
information that a trigger event has occurred, the distributed ledger would
immediately reflect that the holder no longer has any ownership interest in
the smart coco, but instead has an ownership interest in the equity of the
issuer. By design, humans would have no real opportunity to interrupt the
performance of the conversion.110

106
107

See Cohney et al., supra note 93, at 594.
See Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 315, 317

(2013).
108
Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18
FORD. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 852 (2013).
109
See id. at 852–53.
110
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 94, at 332.
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III. POTENTIAL THREATS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
FROM FINANCIAL ALGORITHMS
Part III provides an analytical framework for assessing the threats that
increased reliance on algorithms could pose for financial stability. It demonstrates that problems will likely arise from increased complexity and speed,
as well as the propensity of algorithms to entrench tendencies towards destabilizing correlation. This Part also suggests that the financial industry’s failure to consider the externalities of its activities is likely to be exacerbated by
increased reliance on algorithms. This Part uses the business models of roboinvesting, marketplace lending, high-frequency trading, and tokens as illustrative examples, but this discussion is not restricted to any particular business model; it has broader application to all algorithm-reliant financial
business models, even those that have not yet emerged. Given how nascent
the relevant technologies are, this Part does not attempt to provide an exhaustive catalog of the potential threats that driverless finance could pose for
financial stability. Nonetheless, the threats that are already apparent are sufficient to raise concerns about how financial stability could be undermined
as driverless finance becomes increasingly prominent.
A. Algorithms and Complexity
Since the 2008 financial crisis, many have commented on how the increasing complexity of the financial system has rendered it more fragile.111
This manifests in different ways. For example, in the context of risk assessment, complexity “renders the system increasingly opaque to reasoned
human cognition, making it more difficult to make thoughtful judgments
about where risk lies,”112 and exacerbates our pre-existing tendency to underestimate low-probability but high-consequence tail risks113 (which are the
very risks that are most likely to cause financial crises).114 Complexity also
breeds opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and capture, undermining the
efficacy of regulation implemented to bolster the stability of the financial
system.115 Such concerns about the adverse impacts of complexity will only
be magnified as financial algorithms become increasingly intricate and
autonomous.116
111
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008); Dan Awrey,
Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 235 (2012); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV 63 (2012).
112
Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business As Usual, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
861, 872 (2015).
113
See id.
114
See Allen, supra note 4, at 206.
115
See id. at 187, 199.
116
For example, the FSB has noted that “the complexity and opacity of some big data
analytics models makes it difficult . . . to assess the robustness of the models or new unfore-
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Admittedly, human beings have a very flawed history of financial risk
assessment, one that has seen asset bubbles develop over and over again—as
well as panics, once the bubble bursts.117 At first blush, it might seem that
replacing human foibles with sterile computer processing might improve
such risk assessment: if we utilize Daniel Kahneman’s “System 1” and
“System 2” framework to conceptualize human decision-making, we might
anticipate that algorithms would be free from the instinctual responses generated by System 1, which were most likely developed as an evolutionary
response to the difficulty of processing vast amounts of information
quickly.118 These mental shortcuts or “heuristics” are often ill-suited to generating accurate risk assessments in the financial context.119 Algorithms specialize in processing vast amounts of information quickly, and thus are less
likely to need a coping mechanism like System 1. Instead, they are more
likely to resemble the deliberative cognitive process of System 2. However,
notwithstanding that algorithms are better equipped to deal with large
amounts of information, there are still a number of reasons to be skeptical of
entirely automated risk-assessment procedures.
First, and most obviously, algorithms may have bugs that prevent them
from working as intended. A second more nuanced concern arises with respect to predictive algorithms: attempting to translate complex decisionmaking into the formal logic of algorithmic code is bound to result in oversimplifications and unanticipated errors,120 in particular, to “privilege the
measurable and mask uncertainty.”121 The uncertainty associated with tail
risks is particularly likely to be masked or ignored because algorithms work
most efficiently (meaning firms using algorithms will be able to perform
their functions at greater speeds) if there are fewer lines of code. In business
models like high frequency trading where speed is a key competitive advantage, attempting to cater for unpredictable tail events by including more lines
of code would be viewed as unnecessarily slowing down the functioning of
the algorithm.122 The issue of algorithms and speed will be explored more
fully in the next section.
Where speed is less of a competitive advantage, an algorithm could
potentially consider a broader universe of variables in making a risk assessseen risks in market behaviour, and to determine whether market participants are fully in control of their systems.” FSB Fintech Report, supra note 12, at 2.
117
For historical discussions of financial bubbles, see ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES
AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014), and CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
118
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW, 20–21 (2011).
119
See ANDREW W. LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE SPEED OF
THOUGHT 252–53 (2017).
120
“[T]heir translation efforts are colored by their own disciplinary assumptions, the
technical constraints of requirements engineering, and limits arising from the cost and capacity
of state-of-the-art computing.” Bamberger, supra note 27, at 708.
121
Id. at 676.
122
See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1667 (2015).
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ment—particularly if the algorithm were capable of machine learning. With
machine learning algorithms, a programmer will establish the parameters of
the data set that the algorithm should learn from (a process known as “feature selection”),123 and the algorithm will then make its own decisions about
which data to take into account in assessing risks. However, such assessments will be circumscribed by any limitations in the feature selection, and
the process by which the algorithm decides which variables are relevant and
how to weight them will be opaque to everyone.124 Furthermore, while such
algorithms can observe correlations, they cannot determine causation125: they
may therefore misjudge the impact of a variable on a risk assessment. If a
machine learning algorithm were to make a demonstrable mistake in assessing risk, the technology does not yet exist to teach the algorithm not to make
the same mistake again in the future.126 As such, notwithstanding that algorithmic risk-assessment is likely to be superior to human judgment in
some respects, we should be wary of automating the process entirely.
Unfortunately, the more “driverless” an algorithm purports to be, the
more likely human beings—whether regulators or market participants—are
to defer to its risk assessment without interrogating its underlying processes.
These tendencies have been referred to as “automation biases—decision
pathologies that hinder careful review of automated outcomes.”127 Such biases can lead humans to “disregard or not search for contradictory information in light of a computer-generated solution that is accepted as correct.”128
Such biases have been demonstrated to be particularly likely to arise in circumstances where it is in a person’s financial interest to defer to the algorithm’s decision129 (which can occur when an underestimation of tail risk
allows people to believe they are receiving above-market returns on their
investments).130
There is also a temptation for those proficient in algorithms to exploit
these automation biases to avoid the spirit of the regulation, while apparently
complying with its letter (a phenomenon referred to as “regulatory arbitrage”).131 Machine learning techniques are already being used by banks to
123

See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 681

(2017).
124

See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 58, at 22.
See FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 6.
126
See Tutt, supra note 5, at 89; Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 11.
127
Bamberger, supra note 27, at 676.
128
Id. at 712.
129
See id.
130
“To satisfy demand for seemingly higher-yield, lower-risk products, financial institutions often use financial engineering to consolidate risk in the tail where investors are notoriously likely to disregard it . . . When investors do not properly recognize the tail risk inherent
in a financial instrument, they are likely to accept a yield that does not properly compensate
them for the risk they are taking on, and the instrument is likely to be wildly popular.” Allen,
supra note 4, at 216–17.
131
Regulatory arbitrage has been described by one commentator as the exploitation of
“the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment,
taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that
125
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refine their compliance with regulatory capital and other prudential requirements., and the Financial Stability Board has raised concerns that, while legal, these efforts may increase systemic risks by allowing “much tighter
liquidity buffers, higher leverage, and faster maturity transformation than in
cases where AI and machine learning had not been used for such optimization.”132 Some programmers (or their employers) may even use the complexity of algorithmic programming to purposefully over-engineer and rapidly
update code in order to confound competitors and deflect regulatory scrutiny.133 Frank Pasquale has also raised concerns that the complexity of financial algorithms will be used to cognitively capture the regulators, meaning
that the developers of the technology will be able to convince regulators that
they, rather than less tech-savvy regulators, should be responsible for determining whether algorithms are complying with extant regulations.134
If regulators were to effectively wave the white flag with respect to
supervision of complex financial algorithms, the increased use of such algorithms would have a broadly deregulatory effect. For example, if regulators
were to determine that the algorithms used by marketplace lending platforms
were so complex as to be inscrutable, then that could facilitate a situation
where mispriced credit is extended to dubious applicants, fueling a bubble in
the assets that such credit is used to purchase.135 The marketplace lending
firm Prosper, for example, assigns “risk ratings” to individual loans to assist
investors in selecting loans in which to invest.136 If such risk ratings were
assigned by a machine learning algorithm that learned to assess borrower
risk in a way that neglects a shared characteristic of many borrowers, then
those borrowers could default en masse in the event of a circumstance unanticipated by the algorithm (the relationship between increased use of algorithms and correlation will be explored in greater detail later in this Part).
Investors in marketplace loans typically have little loan-level data and are
thus largely reliant on the output of the platform’s algorithms to judge possible investments.137 If those algorithms are inscrutable, then that may entrack the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.” Victor Fleischer, Regulatory
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
132
FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 31.
133
See Awrey, supra note 111, at 263–64.
134
See Examining the Fintech Landscape: Hearing Before the Subcomm. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 68, 76 (2017) (statement of Frank Pasquale,
Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law). Such arguments about technological complexity have succeeded in the past, such as when regulators
acceded to the Basel II Capital Accord, which essentially allowed the largest banks to set their
own regulatory capital requirements using complex internal modeling. See Erik F. Gerding,
The Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN
L.J. 357, 375 (2016).
135
For a discussion of how securitization demand resulted in nontraditional mortgage
lending prior to the financial crisis, see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a
Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007).
136
See PROSPER, A GUIDE TO INVESTING IN MARKETPLACE LENDING 3 (2016), https://
www.prosper.com/about-us/wp-content/uploads/InvestorsGuide.pdf.
137
See Kirby & Worner, supra note 76, at 41–42.
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courage loans that are “over-issued relative to what would be possible under
rational expectations.”138
The Treasury Department has already noted that “[n]ew business models and underwriting tools have been developed in a period of very low interest rates, declining unemployment, and strong overall credit conditions,”
and that “this industry remains untested through a complete credit cycle.”139
If a bubble were to develop in marketplace loans and then burst, then that
could have a deleterious impact on the broader economy. Admittedly, because investors in marketplace loans have no contractual right to receive
immediate repayment from the marketplace lending platform (instead, repayment is subject to the terms of the note issued by the platform to the
investor and conditioned upon repayment by the ultimate borrower), the
marketplace lending model does not appear to be susceptible to runs in the
way that banks reliant on deposit funding are.140 However, because of the
opacity relating to the quality of individual marketplace loans and the algorithms used to judge them, any of the following might incentivize investors
to panic and stop providing funding for future marketplace loans: concerns
about the ability of the platforms’ algorithms to select creditworthy borrowers, concerns that borrowers are defaulting on existing marketplace loans
(particularly if such defaults are correlated),141 and fears that secondary
securitization market demand for marketplace loans is drying up. Marketplace lending has become an increasingly important source of funding for
small business enterprises, many of whom roll over these loans in order to
meet their funding needs,142 so if investors were to retreat from renewing
funding en masse, then that would harm those enterprises and hamper
broader economic growth.143 There could therefore be significant, tangible
consequences if the complexity of marketplace lending algorithms render
them impenetrable to regulators and market participants alike.

138
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility 5 (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 114.2010, 2010).
139
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE
MARKETPLACE LENDING (2016).
140
See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 50–51 (5th ed.
2013). It is theoretically possible, though, that a P2P lender may refund investments for reputational reasons, just as Citibank did for investors in its Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs)
during the financial crisis. This occurred without any legal obligation to do so, and such a
course of action could impact the P2P firm’s solvency. For a discussion of Citibank’s treatment
of SIVs during the financial crisis, see FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 380 (2011).
141
The issue of “correlation by algorithm” will be examined in more detail in Part III.C.
142
See Clozel, supra note 78.
143
One industry participant has estimated that institutional investors now provide
“80–90% of the capital deployed through Prosper and Lending Club.” Nav Athwal, The Disappearance of Peer-to-Peer Lending, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
groupthink/2014/10/14/the- disappearance-of-peer-to-peer-lending. “Institutional investors . . .
may herd to avoid falling behind one another by picking the same stocks as each other.”
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 767, 777–78 (2002).
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B. Algorithms and Speed
The speed with which algorithms operate can also be a problem for
financial stability: as Andrei Kirilenko and Andrew Lo wryly note,
“whatever can go wrong will go wrong faster and bigger when computers
are involved.”144 Financial algorithms can make and implement decisions
too quickly for any human intervention (by their programmers, users or regulators), even when something clearly erroneous has occurred. The fact that
algorithms work well most of the time can exacerbate this problem; as has
been noted in the driverless car context, “[a] technology that works well
right up to the point that it doesn’t, particularly when that point demands the
attention of a user who has lost concentration, represents a significant regulatory problem.”145 Algorithmically-increased transaction speeds also allow
for an increased volume of transacting,146 and increased volumes of transactions allow for institutions to contract with more counterparties, resulting in
an even more interconnected financial system.147 Increased transactional
speed thus facilitates an environment where “the numerous linkages between financial institutions and products function as feedback loops that can
speed up and amplify the transmission of shocks throughout the financial
system.”148
Issues resulting from the speed with which financial algorithms process
data and respond have manifested most obviously in the context of highfrequency trading, with several algorithmic trading glitches (most notably
the Flash Crash) sending financial markets haywire.149 While such glitches
have not yet caused irreversible systemic problems, that does not mean that
they will not do so in the future. As I have noted in prior work, increased use
of high-frequency trading algorithms can “build rigid feedback loops and
tight coupling into the financial system, with the result that a shock in one
asset class can be transmitted quickly through the equities markets and disrupt pricing and liquidity in other parts of the financial system in short order.”150 Similar problems could also arise in the robo-investment context: if
algorithms were designed to execute trades on behalf of investors without
any input from those investors (for example, if they automatically rebalance
investor portfolios) and some glitch forced an en masse sale of a particular
type of asset, then the price of that asset class would be depressed and financial institutions exposed to that asset class might be forced to sell other as-

144
Andrei A. Kirilenko and Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law versus Murphy’s Law: Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (2013).
145
Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 17–18.
146
See Omarova, supra note 54, at 760–61.
147
See id. at 775.
148
See Allen, supra note 112, at 872.
149
See Allen, supra note 27, at 738.
150
Id. at 743.
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sets in order to maintain their solvency. In this way, such a dynamic could
ignite fire sales in a variety of different markets.
When algorithms facilitate the execution of transactions at such a pace,
they preclude the exercise of reasoned human judgment and intervention.
Such problems can arise not only when algorithms are making decisions
about transacting in financial assets, but also when there is an algorithm
embedded in the financial asset itself. However, the risks to financial stability that could arise from using smart contracts to speed up the execution of
financial transactions have not yet been explored. These smart contracts are
algorithms programmed to self-execute upon the receipt of the necessary
instructions or data; for proponents of smart contracts, one of their greatest
attributes is said to be their “immutability.”151 Unfortunately, the future operations of the financial system are uncertain in the Knightian sense, meaning that future outcomes and their probabilities are unknowable.152 Because
no algorithm can be programmed in advance to address all potential scenarios, subsequent changes may therefore be necessary to vary the operation of
the smart contract.153
Legal systems interpreting paper financial contracts have developed the
ability to relax and suspend contractual obligations in order to help preserve
financial stability upon the occurrence of a significant unanticipated event.154
As Katharina Pistor has noted, “in the context of a highly instable financial
system, the elasticity of law has proved time and again critical for avoiding a
complete financial meltdown.”155 Smart contracts have the potential to harm
financial stability by depriving the financial system of some of its flexibility:
to the extent that smart contracts are recorded and run on a decentralized
distributed ledger, there is no one individual who can vary the preprogrammed operation of that contract156—even if the result diverges from the mutual intent of the parties thereto, as well as the public interest.157 While smart
contracts may not turn out to be as immutable as they claim to be (traditional
ex post legal remedies may ultimately be able to be applied to force the
alteration of the distributed ledger on which the smart contract is hosted in
order to undo a transaction), the damage may already have been done as a
result of the speed with which the smart contract executed its programming
in the first place.

151
“Legal contracts contain ambiguity and permit formal and informal modifications, but
smart contracts are drafted in exhaustive, precise code that seems to set the parties’ obligations
permanently.” Cohney et al., supra note 93, at 615.
152
See Pistor, supra note 107, at 316.
153
Paper contracts rely on the legal system to perform this function: “Since the parties
cannot foresee all contingencies, they can use vague contract terms to delegate to the courts the
task of completing the contract ex post.” Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contractual Design
and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009).
154
See Pistor, supra note 107, at 320.
155
Id. at 321.
156
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 94, at 332.
157
See id. at 318.
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The hypothetical smart coco can be used to illustrate how problems
might arise from this lack of flexibility.158 If a smart coco were designed
with a capital-based trigger (meaning that it were programmed to convert to
equity as soon as the issuer’s ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets fell below a predetermined level),159 then conversion of the smart coco from debt to
equity would be effected immediately upon it receiving information that the
issuer’s ratio had fallen below the specified level (information about the issuer’s ratio would be drawn from an external source—an “oracle,” in smart
contract-speak).160 Many large financial institutions use their own internal
computer models to calculate their ratios of equity to risk-weighted assets;161
if a smart contract were designed to communicate directly with the issuer’s
internal model, a glitch in the operation of that model could force an unwarranted conversion. Because conversion is viewed as undesirable and the trigger event for any coco is designed to be low-probability,162 an erroneous
conversion is likely to incentivize a panic that “is likely to manifest itself in
the form of funding shortages for the coco issuer which will impact its ability to operate as a going concern.”163
If the coco were evidenced by a paper contract, some form of human
intervention would be required to effect the conversion, which would allow
time for verification that the trigger had in fact been met. A self-executing
smart contract would not allow for any such check, however—nor is it clear
how a smart contract would respond to a subsequent correction of the oracle’s information (unless it were preprogrammed to allow for reversals of
conversion). If the smart contract were not programmed to reverse in response to being informed of a problem with the oracle (or if policymakers
were to determine that conversion should be waived even if the oracle were
correct, in the interests of avoiding a shock to the financial system), a reversal could only be carried out by altering the distributed ledger on which the
smart contract was hosted to undo the transaction. Such a reversal would
require the consensus of the majority of the nodes with the power to approve
transactions on the ledger, and on a decentralized permissionless ledger, it
may be hard to identify who those nodes are.164 In the past, established bodies like court systems and central banks have acted to relax legal obligations
to mitigate financial shocks, but their authority and jurisdiction over such
158

For an introduction to the possibility of a smart coco, see Allen, supra notes 108–09.
A 2018 article in The Economist noted that while many cocos are set to trigger if their
issuer’s ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets falls below 5.125%, some cocos specify a trigger
as high as 7%. Coco Bonds Have Not Lived Up to Their Promise, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 21,
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/04/21/coco-bonds-have-notlived-up-to-their-promise.
160
“In the language of smart contracts, systems that interpret such external fees and verify
contractual performance are called ‘oracles.’” Werbach & Cornell, supra note 94, at 336.
161
See Gerding, supra note 134, at 375.
162
See Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
125, 156 (2012).
163
Id.
164
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 94, at 373–74.
159
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nodes is likely to be unclear.165 The result would be a more rigid financial
system that is more prone to meltdown.166
Abstracting away from our smart coco to financial assets more generally, new sources of systemic risk will be introduced into the financial system by any widely-adopted financial asset that is comprised of a smart
contract that speedily and rigidly self-executes.167 While there may ultimately be more opportunities to vary a smart contract’s operation168— and
more opportunities for legal institutions to adjudicate on the outcome of
smart contracts169—than proponents of smart contracts care to admit, there
will still be uncertainties about when the operation of the smart asset can be
changed and challenged, and by whom. The power to vary the operation of a
smart contract (by altering the distributed ledger on which transactions relating to the smart contract are recorded) will typically lie with a group of
validators. To the extent that the ledger is decentralized and permissionless,
coordination and jurisdictional issues may create uncertainty as to whether
and when those validators will in fact alter the ledger.170
Following an unanticipated event, uncertainty about the operation of a
widely-used financial asset comprising a smart contract could paralyze the
use, and thus the liquidity, of that asset class (as well as any linked asset
classes such as derivatives that reference it). Highly leveraged institutions
with significant exposure to such assets might then need to sell those and
other assets, potentially depressing asset prices system-wide (a so-called
“fire sale externality”).171 The confluence of increased speed and correlation
is likely to cause significant damage in these circumstances—the next section will focus in more detail on the role of algorithms in increasing correlation in financial decision-making.
C. Algorithms and Correlation
A panicked fire sale is just one example of “herding,” a well-documented phenomenon that is inimical to financial stability. When market par-

165

See Cohney et al., supra note 93, at 611.
See Pistor, supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text (discussing legal theory of
finance).
167
Pistor notes that in order to avoid systemic failures, safety valves are needed to make
financial contracts more elastic when there has been a significant change in circumstances
such that “one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without
alteration.” Pistor, supra note 107, at 329.
168
It is clear from the SEC’s report on its investigation of the DAO, for example, that the
programmers and validators were able to change the protocol of the distributed ledger to return
virtual currency to persons from whom it had been stolen. See SEC, supra note 105, at 9.
169
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 94, at 42–43. The authors argue that smart contracts have no mechanism for addressing grievances after performance of the contract, and that
the courts will continue to fill such a role. See id.
170
Cf. Reyes, supra note 94, at 411–13.
171
See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 20072008, 23 J. ECON. PERS. 77, 94 (2009).
166
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ticipants behave in a correlated manner, such participation will often lead to
suboptimal outcomes for the financial system as a whole. In particular, herding causes problems by inflating asset bubbles in good times and exacerbating panics—which can take the form of runs, as well as fire sales of assets—
once a shock occurs.172 One concern that has been raised about robo-investing in particular is the potential for algorithms to exacerbate tendencies towards herd behavior by making preferences more monolithic: when financial
decision-making is automated and performed by a few algorithms rather
than a crowd of individuals,173 market behavior is likely to become even
more correlated.174 If robo-investing algorithms are “sticky” (in the sense
that once an algorithm has been programmed, there is a general unwillingness to tinker too much with its operation),175 preferences are likely to remain correlated, even when circumstances change. While humans also
demonstrate tendencies towards path dependency, the switching costs are
presumably lower for changing one’s mind than they are for calling in the
engineers to reprogram an algorithm in light of changed circumstances.
As Tom Baker and Benedict Dellaert note, “the potential solvency and
systemic risks posed by hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of consumers choosing their financial products based on the same or similar models are
sufficiently large and different in kind from those traditionally posed by consumer financial product intermediaries to justify regulatory attention.”176
Robo-investing algorithms currently work by assigning an investor to a particular risk profile (FINRA recently surveyed firms and found that “most
establish between five and eight investor profiles”), and constructing portfolios for each of those profiles.177 Here, economies of scale make financial
advice cheaper for investors, but also allow algorithms to influence the behavior of far larger groups than would be possible for a single human financial advisor. Obviously, such an approach will correlate investments more
than if individualized portfolios were constructed for each customer.178 In
order to avoid the need for costly interpersonal meetings, many robo-investing firms distribute questionnaires to investors online and use the question-

172

See ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 38–43 (2014).
The fintech industry tends towards dominant market players with commanding market
share—a so-called “winner-take-all” market. See William J. Magnuson, Regulating Fintech,
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1212 (2018).
174
See FSB Fintech Report, supra note 12, at 20; see also Baker & Dellaert, supra note
58, at 742. High-frequency trading algorithms also tend to “react to market events in a herdlike fashion.” Allen, supra note 27, at 743.
175
See Bamberger, supra note 27, at 710–11.
176
Baker & Dellaert, supra note 58, at 713. See also Van Loo, supra note 18, at 235
(noting that “if advisory fintechs gave similar advice to large numbers of consumers, they
could produce their own kind of unpredictable mass market movements” akin to prior systemic risk concerns).
177
See FINRA, supra note 60, at 6.
178
If robo-investing algorithms are developed by third-party vendors rather than in-house,
portfolios even across robo-investing platforms may become correlated.
173
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naires as the exclusive basis for their investment recommendations.179 Such
an approach may further increase correlation amongst investment portfolios,
to the extent that it reduces the characteristics of individual investors to
fewer datapoints.180 Of course, there are also limitations on the ability of a
human investment advisor to gather a complete picture of their clients’
needs, but a good argument can be made that the risks of oversimplification
and misunderstandings are greater “when advice is provided using an automated tool than advice provided with human interaction, because of a reduced ability to clarify misunderstandings and ask questions.”181 The
absence of a human contact may also make it more likely that consumers
will fail to advise their robo-investing platform as their personal circumstances change.182 Notwithstanding that human financial advisers can provide more personalized advice than the current crop of robo-investing
platforms, it may prove difficult for human advisers to compete with the cost
savings associated with more automated advice models—this may speed the
trend towards correlation by algorithm.183
As robo-investing platforms increasingly adopt machine learning techniques, some forms of correlation may be mitigated. A machine learning
algorithm may be able to continually search the internet for many different
types of data to inform its understanding of an individual client’s ideal investment portfolio, and it may therefore be able to provide more personalized advice than current robo-investing models.184 A machine learning
algorithm may also be able to learn from changes in the markets and adjust
its decision-making accordingly. However, it is impossible to predict what
machine learning algorithms will do with the personal and market data they
glean;185 it is also unclear what data set will they use to learn what constitutes a good or bad financial decision in any given circumstance. To the
extent that all of the robo-investing algorithms are learning from the same
data set of historical market information, they are likely to learn to react in
correlated ways.186 Machine learning algorithms also tend to learn

179

See generally, SEC, PUB NO. 2017–02, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE UPROBO-ADVISERS 1 (Feb. 2017).
See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, PUB NO. JC 2015 080, JOINT COMMITTEE DISCUSSION PAPER ON AUTOMATION IN FINANCIAL ADVICE 14 (2015). Such data points might
include “the investor’s tax situation, marital or relationship status, the investor’s career and
retirement plans, what other investments and assets the investor has, the investor’s financial
resources and commitments, and the investor’s plans for their family in the short and longer
term.” Id. at 14.
181
Id. at 22.
182
See id. at 22-23.
183
See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue the Retail Market, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 106 (2018).
184
Cf. FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 30.
185
See id.
186
See Mattioli, supra note 1, at 284 (discussing machine learning and training data in the
autonomous vehicle context).
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probabilistically,187 meaning there is a real concern that such algorithms will
consistently underemphasize low-probability but potentially high-consequence risks in choosing investment strategies.
If different robo-investing algorithms behave in consistent ways,188 or if
a few robo-investing platforms (and their algorithms) achieve market dominance,189 then that could create the conditions for both bubbles and panics.190
A bubble could form, for example, if numerous consumers are advised to
invest in the same financial portfolio, or if they are steered to a particular
asset by an algorithm that underestimates the asset’s associated risks. If that
same algorithm advises selling assets, then the occurrence of that event
could have a sudden impact on the price of those assets system-wide, and
depressed asset prices might force other market participants to sell other
assets to deleverage. This would create problems for asset pricing in general
and the stability of the financial system as a whole.191 Even if the algorithm
doesn’t advise selling, individuals with correlated portfolios may still panic
and do so: “each acting individually but, as a group, influencing asset prices
and affecting the trading decision of others.”192 This bubble-bust dynamic
would be particularly acute in the event that the relevant algorithms were not
programmed (or did not learn) to perceive the initial stages of disenchantment with an asset. In such a situation, they might continue to recommend
buying as usual (without adjusting for stressed market conditions) until conditions become so fraught as to trigger a panicked response from either the
algorithm or investors.193

187

See Tutt, supra note 5, at 90.
In the context of high-frequency trading, Yadav has noted that algorithms are often
based on similar assumptions, and thus often react to market events in a herd-like fashion. See
Yadav, supra note 122, at 1625. Correlated behavior is also likely to result because the development of machine learning for use in robo-investing applications is currently dependent on a
“relatively small number of third-party technological developers and service providers.” FSB
AI Report, supra note 6, at 27.
189
Van Loo notes that extreme concentration is endemic in digital markets, “in which as
few as two or three companies capture the bulk of the market.” Rory Van Loo, Digital Market
Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 828 (2019). In its recent report on fintech, the Treasury
Department also noted the network effects that are likely to lead to a concentrated market:
“models that have a large market presence, therefore, have a built-in self- reinforcing advantage as their gains in market share improve the model’s performance, which could in turn
further their gain in market share.” Treasury Report, supra note 17, at 57.
190
Baker and Dellaert have noted that “as robo advisors gain scale, there may be collective action problems that arise from ranking and matching services that are individually rational but have perverse consequences for financial product markets.” Baker & Dellaert, supra
note 58, at 743.
191
See Brunnermeier, supra note 171, at 94.
192
See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Correlation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 347
(2011).
193
See Mattioli, supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing algorithms and edge
cases in the autonomous vehicle context).
188
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Excessive correlation may even undermine a robo-investing algorithm’s
own internal logic:194 many robo-investing algorithms are based on economic theories (like modern portfolio theory) that have embedded assumptions, particularly about the use of diversification to manage risk.195
However, diversification is unable to address systematic risks that affect the
entire market. If investments are increasingly channeled towards just a few
large asset classes (as a result of instructions from the same or similar algorithms), then it will become increasingly likely that a problem with one large
asset class will impact investor sentiment about other large asset classes.
This type of risk cannot be diversified away, leaving correlated portfolios
more susceptible to a shock to the financial markets. This is not just a retail
investor issue, either—sophisticated hedge funds are also increasingly relying upon machine learning to inform their trading decisions.196
Correlation by algorithm could also result from the marketplace lending
business model. Here, firms like Prosper and Lending Club use algorithms to
screen potential borrowers and tout their resulting ability to approve borrowers who would not qualify under traditional FICO assessments (through
origination and servicing fees, they also profit from approving increased
volumes of loans).197 In an industry where only a few firms (and their algorithms) dominate,198 there is the possibility that using an algorithm to make
credit decisions could result in credit being channeled consistently to the
same type of borrower, whereas there might be more variation in approval
decisions if credit approvals were based on judgments by different human
beings. Correlations in these algorithms’ assumptions about who should and
should not qualify for credit could have broader systemic implications if
they systematically underestimate or misprice the risk associated with a particular type of borrower (particularly if credit approval algorithms are capable of machine learning and learn to become more lax in response to data
about the declining interest rates of other lenders, which could result in a
race to the bottom).199
Correlation by algorithm could also arise in other (perhaps as yet
unimaginable) contexts. The Financial Stability Board has already started to
urge caution in light of the fact that many of the machine learning applications that have been developed to date rely on a “relatively small number of

194
As Whitehead put it, coordination “can erode key presumptions underlying financial
risk management, reducing its effectiveness and magnifying a systemic impact of a downturn
in the financial markets.” Whitehead, supra note 192, at 326.
195
FINRA, supra note 60, at 3–4.
196
FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 18–19.
197
See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 445, 469 (2011).
198
For a discussion of market concentration, see FSB AI Report, supra note 6.
199
To illustrate the plausibility of such a scenario, one can consider the instance where
“the price of a book, The Making of a Fly by Peter Lawrence, ballooned on Amazon from a
few dollars to over twenty-three million dollars because each of two sellers of the item had
algorithmically set its price in relation to the other.” Yadav, supra note 122, at 849.
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third-party technological developers and service providers.”200 A single
glitch or operational failure could thus impact many otherwise disparate financial service providers. Even if the impact of such a glitch or operational
failure were confined to one or a few institutions, uncertainty about the reliability of technology may be sufficient to damage confidence in otherwise
unaffected financial institutions. When a financial institution relies heavily
upon short-term debt to fund its operations (as many do), a loss of confidence can imperil the continuing availability of that funding, and potentially
result in the insolvency of the institution.201 Correlation by algorithm
(whether actual or perceived) is therefore a trend to be watched with care.
As the next section will explore, increased reliance on algorithms for financial decision-making may also cause other (more indirect but still problematic) consequences for the stability of our financial system.
D. Algorithms and Industry Culture
Morality is broadly relevant to any discussion of financial stability:
even when not fraudulent, many of the behaviors that generate financial crises evince a disregard for the impact of negative externalities on other members of society.202 There is therefore a place in financial stability regulation
for reforms that seek to engender industry-wide cultural norms that can act
as a disciplinary force, creating an environment in which financial industry
personnel will consider the long-term impact of their risk-taking on society
as a whole.203 Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority, and many
other central banks and financial regulators have been particularly vocal
about the importance of shaping institutional cultures in a way that promotes
financial stability.204 Interesting questions are raised about cultural reform,
however, when algorithms (which operate by way of on-off rules and linear
and logical progressions of decision trees) start to take over tasks that would
have in the past been completed by human beings.
Regulatory initiatives aimed at improving financial industry culture
have certainly been critiqued. Questions have been raised about whether
such efforts will be effective, or whether they are ultimately a distraction
200

FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 27.
See Allen, supra note 108, at 862.
202
See Allen, supra note 112, at 870.
203
“[U]nethical cultures have been recognized as a risk for the global financial system.”
John M. Conley et al., Can Soft Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central
Bank’s Supervision of Behavior and Culture, 51 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 773, 777 (2019).
204
See id. at 777. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority has suggested that the
efforts of the financial industry might be better channeled towards the public good if firms take
steps “to enhance employees’ understanding of how their work has a real world impact . . . to
ensure that employees do not regard their work as simply ‘numbers on a screen,’ but acknowledge the importance of a well-functioning finance sector for the wider economy.” FINANCIAL
CONDUCT AUTHORITY, BEHAVIOUR AND COMPLIANCE IN ORGANISATIONS 35 (Dec. 2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-papers/op16-24.pdf.
201
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from more concrete regulatory efforts. Gwendolyn Gordon and David Zaring, for example, have argued that “if the question is how to ensure a stable
banking system, the answer is unlikely to lie solely—or even much—in the
embrace of ethics by bankers.”205 Regulators implementing programs
targeted at industry culture should undoubtedly be mindful of the limits of
cultural change in promoting financial stability and the limits on their ability
to effect cultural change at all. However, other forms of regulation are limited too: it is impossible to prescribe rules for every potential context and
contingency, and so discretion must therefore be left to financial industry
personnel to make appropriate decisions as new situations arise. I have argued that the limitations of regulation justify actively pursuing attempts to
render the financial industry more cognizant of the impacts of its risk-taking
on others—notwithstanding that such attempts will be exceedingly challenging and will not obviate the need for other, more concrete financial stability
regulations.206 More recently, Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav have argued
that the need for industry self-governance will only become more acute as
technology outpaces regulators.207
The Dutch central bank’s Behavior & Culture supervision initiative, intended to address culture “not as a mere component of legal compliance but
as an independent phenomenon with the capacity to cause inappropriate risktaking by financial institutions,” is a promising step in this direction.208
However, the ability of a good corporate culture to discipline risk-taking is
dependent on “social approval, disapproval, praise or embarrassment,” as
well as esprit de corps, in shaping behavior.209 These mechanisms are based
on human emotions and experiences and, as more and more decisions are
delegated to algorithms, the disciplining power of a good corporate culture
will be lessened. As a result, the impact of hard-fought regulatory efforts to
inculcate a good corporate culture will be further limited.210
In particular, the organizational culture literature has recognized certain
phenomena like “ethical fading” and “moral self-licensing” that contribute
to immoral or unethical behavior within businesses. Increased reliance on
algorithmic decision-making is likely to exacerbate the likelihood of such
phenomena occurring. Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick have described
“ethical fading” as a phenomenon whereby individuals are able to engage in
self-deception as to their culpability, and thus avoid the disciplining impact
205

Gwendolyn Gordon & David Zaring, Ethical Bankers, 42 J. CORP. L. 559, 586 (2017).
See Allen, supra note 112, at 909.
207
Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L. J.
235, 243 (2019).
208
Conley, supra note 203, at 7.
209
Andrew W. Lo, The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry, 22 ECON. POL. REV. 17, 19 (2016).
210
“[W]ith greater electronic connectivity—and less actual in-person connection—the
basic human ties that foster self-restraint and greater trust may be lost.” Tom Glocer, The
Effect of Technology on Bank Culture, BANK INNOVATION (Oct. 19, 2016, https://bankinnovation.net/2016/10/the-effect-of-technology-on-bank-culture/.
206
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of beneficial cultural and social norms, “because psychological processes
fade the ‘ethics’ from an ethical dilemma.”211 Once the ethics have been
drained from the decision making context, “individuals can behave in a selfinterested manner and still hold the conviction that they are ethical persons.”212 Some of the mechanisms identified by Tenbrunsel and Messick as
facilitating this self-deception are likely to be exacerbated by increased reliance on algorithms. For example, they note that an actor is more likely to
avoid a sense of moral responsibility when engaging in acts of omission,
rather than commission.213 Viewed in this light, increased reliance on algorithms may result in less ethical behavior from people who rely on algorithms to discharge their functions, because the more that decision-making is
delegated to algorithms, the more the decision makers can divorce themselves from responsibility for the outcomes of those decisions.214 This phenomenon is already manifesting in finance: at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York’s 2016 conference on “Reforming Culture and Behavior in the
Financial Services Industry,” participants raised the concern that “if new
technology can flag technical non-compliance, is there a risk that employees
will conflate an automated answer with an ethical decision?”215 Indeed, psychological research suggests that not only the actors themselves, but even
unrelated third parties, may be more likely to judge the actors more leniently
when the unethical action has been delegated to an algorithm.216 This exempts the actors from any opprobrium which might otherwise have caused
them to have more regard for the implications of their actions.
Ethical fading may also be an issue for the coders who program the
algorithms, in addition to the people who work alongside the algorithms.
Programmers may delude themselves as to the acceptability of the internal
workings of the algorithm on the grounds that if the past practices were
ethical and acceptable, then practices that are similar and not too different
are also acceptable. However, “a series of these small steps can lead to a
journey of unethical and illegal activities.”217 If programmers do not con211
Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224 (2004).
212
Id. at 225.
213
“Acts of omission . . . blur the assignment of responsibility, can create self-biased
perceptions of causes, shifting blame from self to others. In such circumstances, it is highly
likely that individuals’ propensity to engage in unethical behavior increases, because shifting
responsibility to others allows one to divorce oneself from the moral implications of their
actions.” Id. at 230.
214
Tutt notes that “(1) algorithmic responsibility will be difficult to measure; (2) algorithmic responsibility will be difficult to trace; and (3) human responsibility will be difficult
to assign.” Tutt, supra note 5, at 105.
215
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., REFORMING CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY: EXPANDING THE DIALOGUE 18 (2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/governance-and-culture-reform/2016-Culture-Conference-Overview.pdf.
216
See Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Apr. 2011, at 9–10. Kroll et al. note that “decisions made by computers may enjoy an undeserved assumption of fairness and objectivity.” Kroll et al., supra note 123, at 680.
217
Tenbrunsel & Messic, supra note 211, at 228.
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sider the impact of small incremental tweaks that they make to an algorithm,
simply because those tweaks are small and incremental, they will disregard
the collective impact that those changes may have on financial stability. Tenbrunsel and Messick also argue that using “cold language” that disguises the
human cost of business decisions is also effective in promoting ethical fading.218 Algorithmic programming uses even more dehumanized computer
programming languages to effect outcomes, which may further disguise the
human impact of the algorithm’s processes. Decisions that do not contemplate their potential impacts on financial stability may thus become even
more likely as algorithm-reliant business models become increasingly
prominent.
The phenomenon of “moral licensing” may also be exacerbated by increased reliance on algorithms. “Moral self-licensing occurs when evidence
of a person’s virtue frees him or her to act less-than-virtuously,”219 and can
manifest at the organizational, as well as the individual, level.220 At the organizational level, the result is that some people may consider themselves licensed by the good deeds performed by in-group members, and thus feel
free to neglect ethical concerns without feeling any compunction in their
own self-regard or in shame from others.221 Prosocial behavior—like consideration by a financial institution employee of the impact of his or her activities on financial stability—can thus be rendered less likely when there is
some kind of outward “proof” of the virtue of the employee, or the institution as a whole.222 If algorithms are seen to be making virtuous decisions
(particularly in terms of managing risks), then increased reliance on algorithms could also result in a moral licensing effect, increasing the propensity
of human employees to disregard the impact of their own activities on financial stability.
The FCA has recognized that undesirable behavior might be easier for
humans to justify in environments of ambiguity and complexity—because
“unclear rules permit self-serving interpretations”223—as well as in environments where the impact of the undesirable behavior is far removed from the

218

Id. at 227.
Daniel A. Effron & Paul Conway, When Virtue Leads to Villainy: Advances in Research on Moral Self-Licensing 6, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=92587
652.
220
See id. at 5.
221
See id. at 6.
222
In a recent paper exploring the relevance of psychological findings for compliance in
financial institutions, the FCA situated this phenomenon of moral licensing in the financial
regulatory context by giving the example of the pre-Crisis FSA’s practice of vetting individual
financial employees to determine their fitness and propriety to perform their roles. In hindsight, the FCA noted that “it is likely that the FSA taking on responsibility for vetting staff
ethics gave the impression that firms did not have to make such considerations themselves,
leading to a reduction in the internal incentives that could have restrained rule breaking.” See
Financial Conduct Authority, supra note 204, at 25.
223
Id. at 22.
219
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actor in question.224 Decisions about financial stability are already plagued
by issues of complexity and causation, and the calculus is likely to become
even more complicated and attenuated as algorithms become increasingly
responsible for financial decision-making. Furthermore, it will be harder to
convey the real-world impact of decision-making to the humans working in
the financial industry if their decisions are further intermediated by complex
algorithmic decision-makers. Attempts that are afoot to discipline financial
risk-taking using virtuous cultural and social norms are therefore likely to be
undercut by increased reliance on algorithms. Where algorithms are capable
of machine learning, if they are programmed to learn from the decisions of
humans who do not prioritize financial stability (perhaps because of ethical
fading and moral licensing effects resulting from increased reliance on other
algorithms), then this will exacerbate cultural disregard for financial stability
in a vicious cycle. For example, a machine learning algorithm might learn
from humans that it should consistently “nudge” customers into financial
products and services that generate higher margins for the algorithm’s proprietor by obscuring the true costs and risks of a product, potentially contributing to a bubble.225
Before concluding this pessimistic discussion, it should be acknowledged that I have made the assumption throughout this section that algorithms are incapable of things like empathy, shame and embarrassment that
can work to enforce human compliance with cultural and social norms. Although it is currently a subject of hot philosophical and technological debate
whether artificial intelligence may someday become capable of empathy,226
that debate is well beyond the scope of this Article. Here, it suffices to say
that although algorithms are already learning to mimic certain aspects of
human empathy,227 it seems likely that the finance industry’s increasing reliance on algorithmic processing power will far outpace the development of
any genuine algorithmic empathy, circumscribing the impact of regulatory
efforts to improve industry culture.
E. Other Concerns Regarding Algorithms and Regulatory Efficacy
Many of the financial stability concerns raised in this Part are simply
not susceptible to solutions by private sector means. It is just not possible to

224
See id. at 23 (“In wholesale markets the negative consequences of rule breaking may
appear to be numbers on a screen, even though they can have large impacts on end
consumers.”).
225
See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1277, 1290
(2017).
226
See Christopher Lum, Artificial Empathy: The Next Frontier, ASIAN SCIENTIST (Jul. 17,
2017), https://www.asianscientist.com/2017/07/features/aswp2017-artificial-empathy/.
227
See Natasha Lomas, Can An Algorithm Be Empathetic? UK Startup EI Technologies is
Building Software That’s Sensitive to Tone of Voice, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 4, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/08/04/empathy/.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\10-1\HLB101.txt

192

unknown

Seq: 36

Harvard Business Law Review

19-FEB-20

10:26

[Vol. 10

program an algorithm to “promote finance stability”228: while a programmer
can thoroughly check their algorithms and data sets for bugs and take the
possibility of tail risks seriously, their appreciation of possible tail risks is
limited without sensitive data about the functioning of other market participants.229 Even an unusually altruistic creator of an algorithm would therefore
face limitations on their ability to avoid systemic risk.230 Financial stability
regulators, however, often have powers that enable them to gather the necessary information, and mandates to use that information to make determinations about emerging systemic risks and how to deal with them. Regulators
therefore have an important role to play in addressing the increasing automation of financial services.231 However, innovation in financial algorithms will
undoubtedly make their jobs more challenging.232
Financial regulators are used to supervising humans with a business and
financial background; although financial firms have long used computer
models to help manage risks, the output of those models could be construed
as a recommendation that was ultimately acted upon by a human being. The
increasing automation of decision-making in the financial industry represents a shift that raises challenging questions for regulators about supervision, liability, and enforcement.233 In terms of supervision, past experience in
supervising financial institution compliance functions may no longer give
much guidance to the next generation of regulators, to the extent that compliance systems will increasingly have to be varied to oversee decision-making by algorithms rather than humans.234 In a similar vein, regulatory
judgments about the quality of management will have to be adjusted to take
into account the challenges that non-technical directors and senior managers
will face in overseeing the technological operations of their firms.235

228
At present, technology limits a programmer’s ability to tie computer logic to the
achievement of amorphous policy goals. See Kroll et al., supra note 123, at 646.
229
See Chris Brummer, Disruptive Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1043
(2015).
230
In reality, because programmers of financial algorithms (and their employers) cannot
appropriate the benefits of financial stability to themselves, there are abundant incentives to
ignore systemic risks, and indeed to rush an algorithm to market without fully testing it in
order to gain a competitive advantage. See Awrey, supra note 111, at 263.
231
“Systemic risk regulation is an example where regulators cannot look to private regulatory strategies. Regulators cannot expect that private actors will be capable of identifying
how the actions of individual firms may make the financial system less stable.” Eric J. Pan,
Understanding Financial Regulation, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1941 (2012).
232
See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 207, at 29.
233
See Chiu, supra note 66, at 92. For a discussion of algorithms, artificial intelligence
and liability in other contexts, see Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of
Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217 (2017); Vladeck, supra note 1.
234
European Banking Authority, supra note 181, at 28. If compliance personnel are not
able to communicate what they need in terms that a computer programmer would understand,
and skilled programmers lack sufficient understanding of financial risk-management and legal
requirements to spearhead such an effort themselves, then the compliance function will also be
compromised. See Bamberger, supra note 27, at 708.
235
See Glocer, supra note 210; FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 34.
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Enforcement strategies will also be affected by the increasing automation of finance. There are already enormous difficulties in using sanctions to
deter harmful destabilizing behaviors by humans working in the financial
industry, largely because of the difficulties in establishing intent and causation sufficient to punish a particular individual.236 Policing destabilizing behaviors becomes even more abstracted if the judgment calls are not even
being made by humans, but instead by an algorithm programmed by humans
(or—even more abstracted—by an algorithm capable of machine learning).237 Regulatory attention will naturally shift to the financial institution
employees who design and train the algorithms, but financial stability regulators have little experience in dealing with computer programmers and data
scientists, and this is likely be a challenging transition (questions also
abound about the liability of financial institutions when the harm can be
traced back to technology developed by a third party vendor).238 In some
instances, it may not even be possible to discern the person (or persons)
responsible for a particular algorithm. A smart contract embedded in a financial asset, for example, could be created and maintained by a loosely connected group of anonymous programmers with no well-delineated legal
relationship to each other or the asset.239
Increased automation of finance may also undermine macroprudential
regulatory strategies adopted in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to promote financial stability. While this “macroprudential toolkit” can be conceived of in different ways, it certainly includes regulatory capital
requirements, liquidity requirements, and stress tests, amongst other
things.240 These tools will struggle with autonomous algorithmic finance. For
example, entirely new classes of smart assets can be created out of whole
cloth by anyone with computer programming knowledge—there is no real
limiting factor on the supply of these assets, which exponentially multiplies
their potential risks.241 There will be considerable uncertainty about how to
236

See Allen, supra note 112, at 909–10.
Vladeck observes that “society will need to consider whether existing liability rules
will be up to the task of assigning responsibility for any wrongful acts [that fully autonomous
machines] commit.” Vladeck, supra note 1, at 121. He has even raised the intriguing possibility of conferring legal personhood on autonomous intelligent machines to allow them to be
held liable for their decision-making. See id. at 150.
238
See FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 26.
239
See Marcel T. Rosner & Andrew Kang, Understanding and Regulating Twenty-First
Century Payment Systems: The Ripple Case Study, 114 MICH. L. REV. 649, 663 (2016).
240
See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation (May 5,
2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke 20110505a.pdf. These
tools seek to strengthen the financial system as a whole by controlling defaults and credit
crunches and reducing the risk of fire sales. See Anil K. Kashyap, Richard Berner and Charles
A.E. Goodhart, The Macroprudential Toolkit, 59 IMF ECON. REV. 145–46 (2011).
241
Omarova notes that cryptoassets are “(a) untethered from, and thus unconstrained by,
any productive activity in the real economy and (b) tradable in potentially infinitely scalable
virtual markets.” Omarova, supra note 54, at 742.
237
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assess the risks associated with those assets, and thus about the levels of
regulatory capital and liquid assets that an institution with exposure to those
assets should be required to maintain.242 Even the regulatory capital and liquidity requirements applied to more traditional asset classes may turn out to
be miscalibrated, as a result of unappreciated correlations amongst asset
classes arising from more uniform algorithmic financial decision-making
models. If these requirements are indeed miscalibrated, then that would increase the likelihood that financial institutions are insufficiently cushioned
against a financial shock. The result would be that if that shock were to
occur, institutions would be forced to engage in asset fire sales that depress
asset prices system-wide—or become insolvent.
Macroprudential regulation also requires ongoing monitoring of the financial system for evolving risks to stability;243 the complexity and speed of
algorithmic transacting will make this already confounding task even more
challenging. The predictive capacity of stress tests, for example, may be undermined because hypothetical stress test scenarios created without the benefit of experience of an automated financial system failure may not tell
regulators much about how the system will fare when something goes awry
in the future. If something does go wrong, the increasingly automated nature
of finance may also undermine the ability of regulators to mitigate panic by
disrupting the mechanisms by which a shock is transmitted through the system.244 Emergency measures like circuit breakers, for example, may not be
able to be deployed in time to force market participants to take a collective
pause and make a more rational assessment of market prices and risks.245
Regulators and central banks have sometimes used communications strategies to restore confidence and prevent panic selling in the past,246 but it is
unclear how strategies designed to appeal to human sentiment will be interpreted by algorithms. It is even unclear how algorithms will respond to more
concrete actions like bail-outs or guarantee schemes: will they be program-

242
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international standard setter that
develops prudential rules relating to banks’ exposure to different asset classes, is considering
whether to “whether to formally clarify the prudential treatment of crypto-assets across the set
of risk categories.” FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, CRYPTO-ASSETS: REPORT TO THE G20 ON
WORK BY THE FSB AND STANDARD-SETTING BODIES 7 (Jul. 16, 2018), http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P160718-1.pdf.
243
See Bernanke, supra note 240.
244
Anabtawi & Schwarcz have observed that ex post financial stability measures tend to
take the form of providing financial safety nets (whether by providing financial support to a
firm or purchasing assets to support market pricing), and disrupting the mechanisms by which
risks are transmitted through the system. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75,
77 (2013).
245
See id. at 117–18 (discussing circuit breakers).
246
See Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 15, 33 (2014).
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med to recognize and respond favorably to such emergency intervention?247
While politically unpalatable, many believe that such measures are sometimes necessary to prevent problems in the financial system from pushing
the economy into a depression248—the rise of driverless finance may limit
the efficacy of future bailouts as a method of quelling market panics, however. As they are increasingly forced to reckon with driverless finance, financial stability regulators will find themselves in the unenviable position of
having to reassess much of what they know about how the financial markets
function.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

FOR

REGULATORY POLICY

Regulators face significant challenges as they approach nascent technologies, which are often shrouded in Knightian uncertainty249 (in the sense
that the potential risks associated with such technologies and their probabilities are unknown, and therefore rational assessments of risks cannot be calculated).250 There is always the concern that early regulation will stifle
beneficial innovation, but waiting for affirmative proof of a technology’s
risks before addressing them can be very costly for society—in some contexts, such costs can be catastrophic and irreversible.251 Furthermore, if “the
public’s interest [remains] entirely unrepresented during the industry’s formative period,”252 regulators will face challenges in altering the workings of a
technology once it is operational.253 This Article has therefore argued that, in
the context of increasingly automated algorithmic finance, early regulatory
intervention is vitally important—notwithstanding limitations on regulators’
ability to precisely identify and quantify the potential impacts of such risks,
and notwithstanding benefits that will potentially be foregone.254
In terms of foregone benefits, most of the excitement about algorithmdriven business models like marketplace lending and robo-investing is
driven by the promise of increasingly efficient and inclusive financial services.255 If financial stability regulation attempts to curb the use of increas247
For a discussion of how such mechanisms have been deployed to restore confidence in
assets and stabilize the financial system, see Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe
Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 399–404 (2016).
248
See, e.g., Martin Neil Bally & Douglas J. Elliott, Avoid Depression, Don’t Ban Bailout,
BROOKINGS, May 12, 2010.
249
See Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1848 (2011).
250
See generally, FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921).
251
See Allen, supra note 4, at 191–92.
252
Wu, supra note 249, at 1850.
253
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
254
Pasquale has made a similar argument that policymakers should not “abandon longstanding principles of financial regulation to make way for forms of financial automation that
have yet to be proven.” Pasquale, supra note 134, at 16.
255
See generally, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at Money 20/20,
Las Vegas, NV (Oct. 23, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-money-2020/).
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ingly autonomous algorithms, then that could restrict the development of, or
access to, products and services that might ultimately benefit individual consumers and investors.256 However, as Pasquale has insightfully noted, “we
should be wary about the ability of technology alone to solve much larger
social problems of financial inclusion, opportunity, and fair, non-discriminatory credit provision.”257 Restricting technological development will not
doom these public policy goals—it will simply require other (potentially
more targeted and deliberate) approaches to achieving them. Furthermore, I
have previously argued that when the regulatory goals of financial stability,
investor/consumer protection, and efficiency conflict, “financial stability is
the normative regulatory goal designed to benefit the broadest group of people” and should be the “apex” concern.258 This Part therefore provides some
concrete recommendations for precautionary action with respect to algorithmic finance, in light of the potential risks highlighted in Part III.
A. Regulating the Innovation Process
A precautionary approach to reviewing a technology considers the process by which it is created, instead of restricting regulatory oversight to the
finished product259 (although oversight should continue once the product is
finished). One way in which such process can be regulated is by requiring
preapproval from a governmental authority before a technology can be marketed;260 in an earlier article, I outlined the benefits of and mechanics for
implementing a precautionary preapproval process for new financial products. To summarize briefly, a preapproval process would force an innovator
“to approach the financial regulator with all the relevant information about
its new product, rather than the regulator scrambling to keep up with the
innovation process.”261 As a precondition to approval, the regulator could
require the innovator to “conduct stress tests and consider the systemic con-

256
See Van Loo, supra note 18, at 232. However, in a previous article, I raised the possibility that in some circumstances “fintech’s promise of increased access to financial services
might seem less like a boon, and more like a way to increase rents at the expense of an
expanding group of uninformed consumers.” Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 579, 609 (2019). In a similar vein, we should remain wary of the possibility
that the “democratization” of financial services through robo-investing and marketplace lending is being pursued in order to develop large monetizable data sets for machine learning, with
little regard for consumer protection or financial stability.
257
Pasquale, supra note 134, at 18.
258
See Allen, supra note 27, at 731. Gordon has also argued that stability should be the
“apex goal” of financial regulation. See Gordon, supra note 43.
259
See Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 10.
260
Tutt has called for the establishment of an FDA to pre-approve machine learning algorithms more generally—this Article restricts its focus to algorithms performing financial functions. See Tutt, supra note 5, at 83.
261
Allen, supra note 4, at 222.
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sequences of any new financial product and present their findings to the
regulator.”262
Because financial market participants “think and plan strategically, and
then make decisions based on their plans,” the predictive capacity of premarket testing of financial products will always be more limited than similar
testing of physical systems,263 but a preapproval process is still valuable. Not
only does a preapproval regime shift some of the costs of testing the innovation to the innovator, if the innovator “knows that it will need to explain or
justify a product to a regulator, but does not think it will be able do so
because the product is overly complicated or poses significant systemic risk,
[it] may abandon or simplify the product without any regulatory instruction.”264 Such an outcome would be beneficial because it would put some
bounds on increasing complexity, which can only really be constrained by
preventing new products from entering the financial system.265 A preapproval regime could similarly constrain the emergence of new types of assets
that might otherwise multiply the amount of risk in the financial system.266A
preapproval process also creates a forum for dialogue between industry and
regulators, which can help educate regulators on new technologies.267 In an
ideal world, such dialogue would help forge a less adversarial and more
cooperative partnership between regulator and industry, where all parties
recognize that financial stability is a mutually beneficial outcome and work
cooperatively towards achieving it.268
Financial products can never be pronounced conclusively safe,269 but
they can be required to meet certain standards before being made available
to the financial markets. As part of a preapproval process, regulators could
require that certain capabilities be built into financial algorithms before they
are approved. For example, to alleviate concerns about a smart asset causing
harm by executing too quickly in erroneous circumstances,270 regulators
could require that some form of circuit breaker be programmed into it, enabling a third-party arbitrator or regulator to pause the smart contract’s selfexecution in emergency circumstances.271 Abstracting from the algorithm it262

Id. at 223.
Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2236, 2265 (2014).
264
Allen, supra note 4, at 224.
265
See Omarova, supra note 111, at 66.
266
See id. at 136. Omarova notes that concerns about the ability of new financial products
to multiply risk in the financial system are especially pronounced in the fintech context, where
“fintech technology can be, and is, used to synthesize tradable financial assets effectively out
of thin air.” Omarova, supra note 54, at 775.
267
See Allen, supra note 256, at 642–43.
268
See id.
269
See Allen, supra note 4, at 195–96.
270
See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
271
The Singapore Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) has noted that in
“safety-critical systems, organizations should ensure that a person be allowed to assume control.” SINGAPORE PDPC, A PROPOSED MODEL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FRAMEWORK 9 (Jan.
2019), https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Resource-for-Organisation/AI/
263
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self, regulators may wish to regulate the construction of the distributed ledgers on which smart contracts are hosted. For example, there could be
requirements that smart assets only be hosted on centralized, permissioned
distributed ledgers. Because such ledgers are controlled by central authorities that authorize the persons who can validate the transactions on the relevant ledger, there would be an identifiable formal cohort of validators that
could be relied upon to quickly correct erroneous transactions when
necessary.272
One might initially assume that regulators would need to access an algorithm’s source code in order to test compliance with regulatory requirements and pre-approve a financial algorithm, but this might not ultimately be
a fruitful exercise (and requiring it would provoke a potentially unnecessary
political fight with the financial industry—many financial algorithms are
guarded “just as Coca-Cola guards its beverage formula”).273 Joshua Kroll
and others note that “inspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer program will behave” in a given situation,274 and that
even very simple bugs can evade the scrutiny of their expert programmers275
(outside regulators would have even greater difficulty in deciphering and
predicting the operation of algorithmic source code).276 But regulators do not
need source code to determine whether required features have been included; they can simply run an algorithm in testing mode and see how it
responds.277 Regulators could also compel the programmer of a predictive
algorithm to explain its workings to regulators more generally (including the
factors that the algorithm was programmed to consider and how they were
weighted). Such explanation would be valuable both in terms of highlighting
risks that the algorithm may pose for the institution deploying it, as well as
contributing to regulators’ understanding of systemic concerns. If a problem

A-Proposed-Model-AI-Governance-Framework-January-2019.pdf. In a related context, Van
Loo has queried whether some kind of slow-down mechanism needs to be programmed into
digital personal assistants like Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Alexa. See Van Loo, supra note 189,
at 879.
272
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 94, at 377–78.
273
See Van Loo, supra note 225, at 1291. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
tried to obtain access to high-frequency traders’ source code, but ultimately abandoned the
effort in the face of industry pressure. See Allen, supra note 27, at 763.
274
Kroll et al., supra note 123, at 638.
275
Id. at 647. Arbesman writes that “a program of only 1,000 lines (relatively short for
even pretty simple programs, and much shorter than most programs used in “the wild”) already has . . . more than a trillion trillion potential pathways that can be traversed, assuming
that branch points occur every so often in the computer code. To check all possible paths—
understanding the implications and soundness of each one—is not only infeasible, it is impossible.” SAMUEL ARBESMAN, OVERCOMPLICATED: TECHNOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF COMPREHENSION, 80 (2016).
276
“For those on the outside seeking to hold algorithms to account, the challenge of legibility is even greater.” Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 30.
277
A regulator “could still learn a great deal without analyzing source code or collecting
large troves of detailed information.” Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1603, 1621 (2019).
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is identified as part of this process, errors in predictive algorithms tend to
be—relatively—easy to fix.278
Machine learning algorithms present a more challenging case, because
of the inability of programmers to explain their workings279 or teach them
not to repeat a previous mistake.280 Given the present uncertainty regarding
the operation of this technology, regulators may wish to start with a highlevel, principles-based regulatory approach that requires financial firms developing machine learning capabilities to ensure that the algorithms be as
predictable and explainable as the technology allows.281 Ideally, such an approach would encourage innovation in, and collaboration with regulators on,
the management of systemic risks at a time when there is considerable uncertainty regarding how to approach machine learning.282 For example, algorithms could be programmed to be able to explain their own decisionmaking and the data considered in reaching that decision.283 To help mitigate
the unpredictability of the operation of a machine learning algorithm during
a tail event, steps could be taken to ensure that these algorithms learn something about the possibility of such events.
There are a variety of different approaches that can be taken to training
machine learning algorithms. One strategy that has been adopted to avoid
“overfitting” (a problem where the model becomes “too specialized or specific to the data used for training”) is for algorithms to be programmed to
make random guesses and learn from the outcomes.284 Unfortunately, in a
tightly coupled and reflexive system like the financial system, the outcomes
of random guesses in normal times will not be predictive of the consequences of doing the same thing in a time of stress. A different strategy will
be needed if we want financial algorithms to learn that their responses to tail
events may have destructive potential and modify them accordingly. In the
autonomous vehicle context, machine learning algorithms use what is known
as “fleet learning” to develop an understanding of low-probability scenarios
278
“If something goes wrong, the programmer can go back through the program’s instructions to find out why the error occurred and correct it.” Tutt, supra note 5, at 93.
279
See Kroll et al., supra note 123, at 638.
280
See Tutt, supra note 5, at 89; Stilgoe, supra note 1, at 35.
281
For a discussion of the utility of principles-based regimes in regulating unfamiliar technologies, see CENTER FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS (MILKEN INSTITUTE), FINTECH: BUILDING A
21ST-CENTURY REGULATOR’S TOOLKIT 6–7 (Oct. 2014), http://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/3.14-FinTech-Reg-Toolkit-NEW.pdf. For further discussion of
the problems of predictability and explainability, see Tutt, supra note 5, at 101–04.
282
“A principles-based regime gives regulatory agencies an umbrella framework under
which to deploy informal regulatory strategies to deal more flexibly with new industry practices as they arise.” Allen, supra note 256, at 603.
283
See SINGAPORE PDPC, supra note 271, at 13. “[T]here is reason to believe that algorithm designers can design machine-learning algorithms with attention to ensuring explainability.” See also Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018); Joshua A. Kroll, The Fallacy
of Inscrutability, 376 THE ROYAL SOC’Y PUB (2018), https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2018.0084.
Tutt, supra note 5, at 108.
284
See Kroll et al., supra note 123, at 684.
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and how to deal with them.285 An equivalent process to fleet learning would
not be effective in training financial algorithms about how to react in crisis
situations, though, because low-probability events in the financial system do
not happen randomly over a long period of time (which would allow for
incremental learning). Instead, such events tend to happen all at once (sometimes decades after the last significant crisis), leaving the algorithms no time
to learn how to react.286 In order to mitigate systemic risk, financial algorithms capable of machine learning may therefore need to be exposed to
hypothetical scenarios that emphasize worst-case scenarios and demonstrate
the consequences of correlated responses to such events.
Study of the stress testing hypotheticals that are currently used in the
financial industry may yield insights on how to perform feature selection for
financial algorithms capable of machine learning,287 but extant financial
stress testing methodologies certainly will need to be adapted for this purpose.288 Often, stress testing relies on historical data that may not be predictive of future stress scenarios involving more automated algorithmic
decision-making.289 Also, the stress tests that are currently deployed tend to
be focused on a particular outcome290—macroprudential stress tests, for example, are designed to determine whether a financial institution has sufficient capital to withstand a systemic shock.291 When training a machine
learning algorithm, the capitalization of the firm deploying the algorithm
would not always be the main focus—often, the interaction of the algorithm
with other algorithms in the financial system will be more important. The
hypothetical scenarios used should therefore not be engineered towards testing for a particular outcome, but instead should be designed to find out
“what would happen if . . . ,” in order to train algorithms to anticipate and
mitigate the systemic repercussions of their decisions.

285

See Surden, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Crawford observes that the rarity of such events makes it difficult to practice and receive feedback on reactions. See John Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: The Problem of
(In)Experience and Regulator Expertise, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 111, 160 (2015).
287
“As part of the regulatory toolkit, macro stress tests should contain such (systemic
risk) externalities by ensuring that the financial sector is sufficiently capitalized to continue
financial intermediation in a severe economic downturn. To simulate a severe economic downturn, regulators define a hypothetical stress scenario by specifying shocks to different
macroeconomic and financial variables. The adverse scenario is translated into losses to assets
on the balance sheet of banks using models that capture the sensitivity of banks’ exposures to
the stress scenario. These losses are assumed to be first borne by equity capital. The required
capitalization of a bank is assessed using measures (the capital ratios) of the financial performance of the bank after application of the stress test model.” Viral Acharya et al., Testing
Macroprudential Stress Tests: The Risk of Regulatory Risk Weights, 65 J. MON. ECON. 36, 36
(2014).
288
Stress tests do not yet model the impact of the disruptions that could be caused by
artificial intelligence. See Van Loo, supra note 189, at 879.
289
See Weber, supra note 263, at 2240 (discussing the historical focus of many stress
testing methodologies).
290
See id.
291
See Acharya et al., supra note 287, at 38.
286
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Robert Weber has referred to this type of approach to stress tests as
“deliberation-oriented”; he describes such an approach as “privileg[ing]
dynamic scenarios; draw[ing] from business operations culture; rel[ying]
on imagination; consider[ing] the interactivity of tested variables; remain[ing] open to uncertainty.”292 The difficulty and cost of developing the
scenarios for this type of stress test should not be understated. This is something that only the largest financial institutions would be capable of doing
in-house— and from a public policy perspective, it is not clear that it would
be desirable for them do so.293 If a firm does create its own hypothetical
training scenarios, regulators at the very least should require records and
explanations of the scenarios used.294 For most market participants, though,
the regulator will need to provide some form of hypothetical scenario to be
used as training data. Regulators could devise such scenarios by requiring
the proprietors of certain financial algorithms to have their algorithms participate in “war games,” which are coordinated simulations designed to “inspire creative problem solving and to spur [them] to think about unthinkable
outcomes.”295 Participation in such war games could also function as a training exercise for the algorithms—a chance to practice reacting to tail events
and receive feedback on the outcome of their decisions in a theoretically
stressed context.296
By training all machine learning algorithms with the same hypothetical
scenarios, attempts to encourage these algorithms to take into account the
possibility of destabilizing correlated behavior may ultimately serve to further correlate the behavior of the algorithms. To mitigate this, the war games
conducted by regulators should focus on the reflexivity of algorithmic interactions (meaning that when algorithms learn to react to the scenarios they
have been exposed to, the operation of the scenario itself becomes altered).297 Regular adjustments to the scenarios should also be made to reflect
changed circumstances and understandings about sources of risks, and the
channels through which such risks can be transmitted through the system.298
292

Weber, supra note 263, at 2240.
Such an approach could raise similar concerns as the internal models approach to capital regulation: “the Basel II Accord allowed certain large financial institutions to set their own
regulatory capital levels according to their proprietary risk models . . . financial institutions
used these models to lower their capital requirements.” Gerding, supra note 134, at 375.
294
See SINGAPORE PDPC, supra note 271, at 11, 14.
295
Weber, supra note 263, at 2264. To some extent, these wargames could be simulated
using agent-based modeling on computers—while the predictive capacity of such models has
been critiqued for making heterogeneous assumptions about the behavior of market participants, such heterogeneous assumptions may become increasingly appropriate as more and
more decision-making is delegated to algorithms. Where behavior is relatively predictable,
“complexity arises from the interaction of agents, not from the structure of the agents’ individual decision-making rules.” Crawford, supra note 286, at 166.
296
See Crawford, supra note 286, at 160.
297
For a discussion of reflexivity, see Awrey, supra note 111, at 257–58; Crawford, supra
note 286, at 162.
298
For a discussion of the current understanding of risk transmission channels, see
Kashyap, Berner & Goodhart, supra note 240.
293
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B. Ongoing Oversight
As the technology becomes better understood and best practices emerge
over time, best practices for algorithmic design could be enshrined in formal
rules regulating the creation of those algorithms, limiting the deregulatory
potential that has been observed in some other principles-based regimes.299
However, while it is critically important that regulators involve themselves
in the process by which financial algorithms (and the ledgers on which they
are hosted) are created, there is also a place for regulatory engagement with
algorithms after they become operational. Supervision efforts will give regulators opportunities to participate in the ongoing testing and training of algorithms, as well as opportunities to assess institutional capacity to manage the
operational risks associated with cyberthreats and third-party vendors.300
Regulatory supervision should also evaluate an institution’s governance and
culture.301
In the first ever Proposed Model Artificial Intelligence Governance
Framework, Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) has
recommended some internal governance structures and measures to assist
organizations in overseeing their own use of artificial intelligence.302 These
recommendations could inform financial regulatory supervision of financial
institutions that rely on machine learning algorithms. The PDPC’s framework stresses the importance of an enterprise risk management structure that
interrogates the selection and continued use of any machine learning model,
with a view to remediation if something goes wrong, and with a particular
focus on errors and bias in the training data used.303 It also recommends that
“ethical considerations [associated with artificial intelligence] be introduced as corporate values and managed through ethics review boards or similar structures.”304 Importantly, the PDPC recognizes that sometimes the
societal risks associated with a particular machine learning application will
be sufficiently great that a firm should not use it at all.305 In this vein, financial regulators should seek to promote deliberative and ethical use of com299
“[D]evolution of responsibility to industry—in the absence of the firm boundaries and
sanctions that would be found in a rules-based regime—can sometimes have deregulatory
consequences.” Allen, supra note 256, at 601.
300
For a discussion of cyberthreats, see Kristin N. Johnson, Symposium Financial Regulation: Reflections and Projections: Risk Management and Regulatory Oversight: Cyber Risks:
Emerging Risk Management Concerns for Financial Institutions, 50 GA. L. REV. 131, 139
(2015). For a discussion of the operational risks associated with relying on third-party suppliers of cloud computing and data services, see FSB Fintech Report, supra note 12, at 2.
301
See Part III.D, supra.
302
See SINGAPORE PDPC, supra note 271, at 5.
303
See id. at 6. One financial industry observer noted that “a human in the loop is essential: we are, unlike machines, able to take into account context and use general knowledge to
put AI-drawn conclusions into perspective.” FSB AI Report, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting FINEXTRA AND INTEL, THE NEXT BIG WAVE: HOW FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CAN STAY AHEAD OF
THE AI REVOLUTION (2017)).
304
SINGAPORE PDPC, supra note 271, at 5.
305
See id. at 7.
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puter modeling as part of the broader cultural initiatives discussed in Part
III.D, aiming to disrupt some of the problematic aspects of algorithmic deference and “automation bias.”306
Unfortunately, the prophylactic regulation recommended by this Article
is unlikely to be completely successful in preventing financial algorithms
from causing systemic problems. Regulators will therefore need to be able to
audit significant algorithmic failures after the fact (both for enforcement purposes and to improve the quality of their ex ante regulation going forward).307 To facilitate future audits, regulators may want to mandate from the
outset measures to ensure that a machine learning algorithm is “traceable,”
meaning that “its decision-making processes are documented in an easily
understandable way.”308 Possible options include requiring “an audit trail to
document the decision-making process,” “implementing a black box recorder that captures all input data streams,” and mandating data storage requirements.309 Compliance with such measures may prove very expensive
for firms and so, as a practical matter, regulators may ultimately need to
scale their application to the size and operations of the regulated firm,
weighing the likelihood of systemic harm against the cost of compliance.310
C. A Note on Jurisdictional and Resource Constraints
Thus far, Part IV has presumed regulatory jurisdiction over the programmers of financial algorithms (in other words, Part IV has so far presumed that each programmer works for a financial institution that is
regulated by a regulator with a financial stability mandate). However, there
are financial institutions that are not regulated by any financial stability regulator,311 as well as financial institutions that elude regulatory oversight en306

See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
In calling for a Consolidated Audit Trail of the equities markets, former SEC Commissioner Kara Stein noted:
307

The Flash Crash and other events in our markets demonstrate the need for CAT.
Only through a consolidated audit trail can we truly know what is happening in our
marketplace, with trading activity cascading across multiple trading venues and asset
classes. The linkages, complexity, and fragmentation of our markets outstrip the current ability to monitor, analyze, and interpret market events. Only through CAT can
we develop regulations that are truly driven by facts. Only through CAT can regulators appropriately survey our high-speed and high volume marketplace.
Kara M. Stein, The Dominance of Data and the Need for New Tools: Remarks at the SIFMA
Operations Conference (Apr. 14, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2015-spch041415kms.html).
308
SINGAPORE PDPC, supra note 271, at 15.
309
Id.
310
The Dodd-Frank Act provides a precedent for such a scaled approach, reserving the
most onerous regulation for the largest and most interconnected firms. See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 115, 12 U.S.C. §?5325 (2010).
311
For a discussion of the lack of financial stability mandates for many U.S. financial
regulators, see Allen, supra note 2, at 1091. While I have previously articulated the need for
national financial stability regulators with broad cross-sectional oversight of all activities that
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tirely by working in a jurisdiction or providing a service that is not covered
by any regulatory regime.312 Non-financial firms with significant technology
operations and data resources (sometimes referred to as “techfins”) are also
largely unsupervised by financial regulators, notwithstanding that some of
them are starting to provide types of financial services.313 Finally, a programmer may not even be connected with any institution at all, as is currently the
case with many of the creators of tokens. This does not mean that there is no
one available to regulate: there are inevitably people who create and profit
from such decentralized technologies, and they could theoretically be regulated.314 Similarly, intermediaries may emerge as a matter of convenience
even if such intermediation is not strictly necessary for a decentralized technology to function315—these intermediaries can also theoretically be regulated. However, establishing jurisdiction over these persons is likely to be
challenging in practice.
Fortunately, regulated financial institutions have such a significant presence in the financial markets that regulatory requirements that delineate
what those institutions can invest in may ultimately have a helpful standardsetting function for all financial assets, even those traded outside of the regulated financial sector. Furthermore, financial institutions are well-recognized
conduits (both in terms of their web of contracts with other institutions and
their leverage-fueled propensity to sell assets at fire sale prices) for transmitting financial shocks to other market participants, allowing such shocks to
metastasize into a financial crisis.316 To the extent that financial institutions
do not have direct or indirect exposure to an asset class, the ability of a
problem with that asset class to generate instability is circumscribed (even
though it is still possible that problems with a class of smart assets that is
widely traded outside of regulated financial institutions could have an impact on the proper functioning of the financial system).317 Regulators could
therefore mitigate systemic risk by discouraging financial institutions from
investing (directly, or indirectly through mechanisms like derivatives) in tokens or other smart assets unless such assets meet certain established criteria
and are hosted on distributed ledgers that similarly meet established crite-

may impact financial stability, the United States has not taken this approach (although countries like the United Kingdom and Australia have). See id. at 1092.
312
See FSB Fintech Report, supra note 12, at 2.
313
See Dirk A. Zetsche et al., From Fintech to Techfin: The Regulatory Challenges of
Data-Driven Finance 10–11, 13 (Eur. Bank. Inst. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 6, 2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2959925.
314
See Omri Marian, Blockchain Havens and the Need for Their Internationally-Coordinated Regulation, 20 N.C. J. OF L. & TECH. 4 (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3357168.
315
See id. at 15.
316
For a discussion of the current understanding of risk transmission channels, see
Kashyap, Berner & Goodhart, supra note 240.
317
See Allen, supra note 100, at 927–28.
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ria.318 Such discouragement could take the form of significant regulatory
capital or liquidity requirements for non-compliant smart assets, for example.319 In sum, notwithstanding very real jurisdictional challenges, financial
stability regulators have a real opportunity to effect change indirectly,
through the financial institutions that they do oversee. In order to do so,
though, they will require significantly increased resources.
Many of the recommendations made in this Part can only be implemented if financial stability regulators are sufficiently computer literate to
interface effectively with computer algorithms and, as machine learning becomes more prominent, data science expertise will also become a vital regulatory skill set. Hiring personnel with such expertise will no doubt be
expensive, and teething pains are to be expected as personnel with this type
of experience integrate into the (arguably somewhat staid) culture of financial regulatory agencies. However, if one accepts this Article’s premise that a
precautionary approach to regulating increasingly autonomous financial algorithms is necessary, such expansion of regulatory capabilities should begin immediately, with necessary funding support from the relevant
governmental bodies.320 Where the recommendations made in this Part can
be implemented (or at least begun) with existing regulatory capabilities,
those efforts should also commence immediately.
CONCLUSION
Driverless cars and driverless finance are both likely to perform well—
perhaps even better than when a human is in control—most of the time.
Both, however, are likely to react in unpredictable and potentially dangerous
ways when confronted with unanticipated low-probability events. Notwithstanding this similarity, regulatory attitudes towards these two types of technologies have been very different so far: regulatory policy regarding
autonomous vehicles has had a much more precautionary bent than the regulation of automated financial decision-making. This Article has argued that,
given the gravity of social harm that can flow from financial crises, policymakers need to turn their attention to finance’s potential harms, and that the
processes by which financial algorithms are being developed should come
under particular regulatory scrutiny. Such efforts are time critical—we may
soon reach an inflection point after which attempts by regulators to influence
the development of the relevant technology will be ineffective.
318
See supra notes 268–70 and accompanying text. In a similar vein, the European
Banker’s Association has recommended policies that discourage regulated financial institutions
from trading and holding virtual currencies. See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, EBA OPINION ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 5–6 (2014), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/
657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual +Currencies.pdf.
319
See Allen, supra note 108, at 828–32 (discussing capital requirements).
320
As Pasquale notes, “regulators’ lack of resources is not simply the natural state of
affairs” but is instead a policy decision. Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of High-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2015).
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This Article will finish on a note of optimism, however. Human beings
don’t have a particularly good track record of avoiding financial crises,321
and the development of autonomous finance could ultimately result in a financial system that is more resilient than the one we currently have.322 This
will not be achieved through deregulation, however, but through partnerships between regulators and programmers that render financial algorithms
more mindful of, and more resilient to, systemic impacts. A forum for this
type of partnership is already being trialed on a small scale in many countries in the form of the “regulatory sandbox.”323 The changes being wrought
to the financial industry by the rise of driverless finance may generate other
opportunities to engineer a collaborative relationship between financial regulators and industry participants, allowing for new financial technologies to
be harnessed at the programming stage in a public-private partnership to
improve financial stability.324 However, if the development of driverless finance is left unchecked by regulation, financial crises will quite possibly
become more frequent and severe than in our more analog past.325
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This is amply demonstrated in Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s book, This Time
is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 117.
322
The FSB believes that more autonomous finance, if done properly, has the potential to
“offer compliance oversight tools; enhanced data simulations for institutions and across markets; real-time connectivity to monitor and respond to risks; and it can help address complexity
challenges at large institutions (e.g. ‘too complex to manage’). These applications can help
financial institutions, as well as supervisors, better understand causal relationships and better
manage risks, and regulatory compliance. Moreover, AI and machine learning can aid supervision by allowing the identification of new relationships in data, without the filter of pre-specified models.” FSB Fintech Report, supra note 12, at 56. See also FSB AI Report, supra note 6,
at 25.
323
For a discussion of this regulatory innovation, see Allen, supra note 256.
324
For a thorough exploration of the possibilities and preconditions for a financial stability-minded public-private partnership, see Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street As Community of
Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).
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As systems increase in complexity, the frequency of problems also tends to increase.
See SAMUEL ARBESMAN, OVERCOMPLICATED: TECHNOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF COMPREHENSION 98 (2016).

